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THE LIQUIDITY TRAP-that  awkward condition in which monetary policy 
loses  its  grip because  the nominal  interest rate is essentially  zero,  in 
which  the quantity of  money  becomes  irrelevant because  money  and 
bonds are essentially  perfect  substitutes-played  a central role in the 
early years  of  macroeconomics  as a discipline.  John Hicks,  in intro- 
ducing  both  the  IS-LM  model  and the  liquidity  trap,  identified  the 
assumption that monetary policy  is ineffective,  rather than the assumed 
downward inflexibility  of prices,  as the central difference  between Mr. 
Keynes and the classics. ' It has often been pointed out that the Alice  in 
Wonderland character of  early  Keynesianism-with  its  paradoxes  of 
thrift, widows'  cruses,  and so on-depended  on the explicit  or implicit 
assumption  of  an accommodative  monetary  policy;  it  has  less  often 
been pointed out that in the late 1930s and early  1940s it seemed quite 
natural to assume that money was irrelevant at the margin. After all, at 
the end of the  1930s  interest rates were hard up against the zero con- 
straint; the average rate on U.S.  Treasury bills  during 1940 was 0.014 
percent. 
Since then, however,  the liquidity trap has steadily receded both as 
a memory and as a subject of economic  research. In part, this is because 
in the generally inflationary decades after World War II nominal interest 
rates have stayed comfortably  above zero,  and therefore central banks 
have  no  longer  found  themselves  "pushing  on  a  string."  Also,  the 
experience  of the 1930s itself  has been reinterpreted, most notably by 
1. Hicks (1937). 
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Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz.2 Emphasizing  broad aggregates 
rather than interest rates or the monetary base,  Friedman and Schwartz 
argue, in effect,  that the Depression  was caused by monetary contrac- 
tion; that the Federal Reserve  could have prevented it; and implicitly, 
that even  the  great  slump  could  have  been  reversed  by  sufficiently 
aggressive  monetary expansion.  To the extent that modern macroecon- 
omists  think about liquidity  traps at all (the on-line  database EconLit 
lists only twenty-one papers with that phrase in title, subject, or abstract 
since  1975),  their view  is basically  that a liquidity trap cannot happen, 
did not happen,  and will  not happen again. 
But  it has  happened,  and to  the  world's  second-largest  economy. 
Over the past several  years,  Japanese money  market rates have  been 
consistently  below  1 percent,  and the Bank of Japan plausibly  claims 
that it  can  do  no  more;  yet  the  Japanese  economy,  which  has  been 
stagnant since  1991,  is  sliding  deeper  into recession.  Since  Japan is 
such an important economy,  and its slump threatens to shatter the al- 
ready fragile  prospects  for economic  recovery  in the rest of Asia,  un- 
derstanding what is going  wrong there has become  quite urgent.  And 
there is also  a deeper reason for concern: if this can happen to Japan, 
perhaps it can happen elsewhere.  In short, it is time to reexamine  the 
theory of liquidity traps, which has turned out not to be irrelevant after 
all. 
But surely economists  already understand liquidity traps well enough 
to  formulate  policy.  Can we  not just  pull  the old  models  out of  the 
basement,  dust them off,  and put them to work? In effect,  that is what 
policymakers  at the U.S.  Treasury and elsewhere  have done: drawing 
on the simple liquidity trap framework that appeared in macroeconom- 
ics textbooks  a generation or so ago,  they have urged Japan to follow 
the classic  recovery  strategy of pump-priming fiscal expansion.  (Since 
hardly anybody in the thoroughly urbanized societies  of modern Amer- 
ica and Japan has any idea what it means to prime a pump,  I hereby 
suggest  that we rename this the jump-start strategy.)  Macroeconomics 
has,  however,  moved  on in several  ways  that require a rethinking of 
the issue. 
In particular, one might identify three strands of modern thought that 
are missing  from the classic  IS-LM analysis.  First is the intertemporal 
2.  Friedman and Schwartz (1963). Paul R. Krugman  139 
nature of  decisions.  Economists  now  understand, perhaps better than 
fifty years ago, that how one formulates expectations  is a crucial matter 
in macroeconomic  analysis,  and that a good first pass assumption is that 
these expectations  are rational. Second is the openness of the economy. 
Although  the Britain of  Keynes  and Hicks  was  actually  a quite open 
economy,  with a share of trade in GDP more than twice that of modern 
Japan, their analysis,  and almost all subsequent analysis of the liquidity 
trap, ignores foreign trade and capital mobility.  It is a justifiable  stra- 
tegic simplification; but since many of the disputes surrounding Japan's 
direction  involve  the future of  the country's  current account  and ex- 
change rate, one needs to know what happens when this assumption is 
relaxed.  Finally,  traditional IS-LM analysis  neglects  the role of finan- 
cial intermediaries.  But how one interprets the experience  of the 1930s 
hinges  crucially  on how broad a monetary aggregate one chooses;  and 
the  same  has  turned out  to  be  true in recent  arguments over  Japan. 
Furthermore, one school  of thought about the Depression  argues that a 
troubled banking system lay at the heart of the problem; a similar view 
has become  near orthodoxy  about contemporary Japan. So one  needs 
at least a basic sense of how financial intermediation fits into the picture 
of the liquidity  trap. 
There  are two  major parts to  this  paper.  The  first is  an extended 
generic  discussion  of the causes  and consequences  of liquidity traps. I 
use  a succession  of  small,  highly  stylized  models  to address both the 
traditional questions  regarding liquidity  traps and a number of  novel 
issues.  The central new  conclusion  of  this analysis  is that a liquidity 
trap fundamentally involves  a credibility problem-but  it is the inverse 
of the usual one,  in which  central bankers have difficulty  convincing 
private agents of their commitment to price stability.  In a liquidity trap, 
the problem is that the markets believe  that the central bank will target 
price stability,  given  the chance,  and hence that any current monetary 
expansion is merely transitory. The traditional view that monetary pol- 
icy is ineffective  in a liquidity trap, and that fiscal expansion is the only 
way out,  must therefore be qualified: monetary policy  will  in fact be 
effective  if the central bank can credibly  promise  to be irresponsible, 
to seek a higher future price level. 
My theoretical  analysis  also  appears to refute two  widely  held be- 
liefs.  First, international capital flows,  which allow a country to export 
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liquidity  trap; because  goods  markets remain far from perfectly  inte- 
grated, the required real interest rate in terms of domestic  consumption 
can be negative even if capital is perfectly mobile and there are positive- 
return investments  abroad.  A  corollary  is that a successful  monetary 
expansion,  in which the central bank does create expectations  of infla- 
tion,  will  probably be less  of a beggar thy neighbor policy,  expanding 
demand at the rest of the world's  expense,  than is widely  imagined. 
Second,  putting financial intermediation into a liquidity trap frame- 
work suggests,  pace  Friedman and Schwartz, that it is quite misleading 
to look at monetary aggregates under these circumstances: in a liquidity 
trap,  the  central  bank may  well  find that it  cannot  increase  broader 
monetary aggregates,  that increments to the monetary base are simply 
added to reserves  and currency holdings,  and thus both that such ag- 
gregates are no longer valid indicators of the stance of monetary policy 
and that their failure to rise does not indicate that the essential  problem 
lies  in the banking sector. 
In the  second  part of  the paper,  I turn to  some  specific  questions 
surrounding Japan. I survey other analysts'  estimates  to consider  four 
main issues.  First is the size of Japan's output gap. I argue that this is 
probably  considerably  larger than the  standard estimates,  and hence 
that the need for expansionary policy  is even greater than is commonly 
supposed.  Second  is  the  reason  for  the  apparent large  gap  between 
saving  and willing  investment  at full  employment.  Third is  the rele- 
vance of Japan'  s banking woes to its macroeconomic  malaise.  Although 
the conventional  wisdom  is that Japanese banks are at the center of the 
problem,  I argue that they  have  played  less  of  a causal  role  than is 
widely  assumed.  Finally,  I make a first attempt at quantifying the size, 
duration,  and side effects  of  the inflation that would be needed to lift 
Japan out of its trap. 
The Theory of Liquidity Traps 
It is useful,  in considering  Japan's liquidity  trap, to begin at a high 
level  of generality,  to adopt what one might almost call a philosophical 
stance. Popular discussion  of the current situation has a strong tendency 
to plunge too quickly into the specifics,  to cite one or another structural 
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of its history, Japan is now in a liquidity trap, so that the generic issues 
surrounding such traps apply. 
A liquidity trap may be defined as a situation in which conventional 
monetary  policies  have  become  impotent,  because  nominal  interest 
rates are at or near zero: injecting monetary base into the economy  has 
no effect,  because  base and bonds are viewed  by the private sector as 
perfect substitutes.  By this definition,  a liquidity trap could occur in a 
flexible price, full-employment  economy;  and although any reasonable 
model  of  the United  States  in the  1930s  or Japan in the  1990s  must 
invoke  some form of price stickiness,  one can think of the unemploy- 
ment and output slump that occurs  under such circumstances  as what 
happens when an economy  is trying to have deflation-a  deflationary 
tendency that monetary expansion  is powerless  to prevent. 
This  may  seem  a  peculiar  way  of  putting  the  issue,  but  it  does 
highlight  the central mystery  of  a liquidity  trap, and the reason why 
structural explanations,  in a fundamental sense,  cannot by themselves 
resolve  that mystery.  For if there is one proposition with which every- 
one in macroeconomics  agrees it is that, aside from the possibility  that 
price stickiness  will cause monetary expansion to be reflected in output 
rather than prices,  increases  in the money supply raise the equilibrium 
price level.  Indeed,  the normal view  is that money  is roughly neutral: 
that an increase  in the money  supply produces  a roughly  equipropor- 
tional increase  in the general price level.3  Or to be more specific,  an 
increase in outside  money-the  monetary base-must  raise prices. 
Putting  the  issue  this  way  immediately  reveals  that many  of  the 
common explanations  of why Japanese monetary policy  is ineffectual 
are wrong,  or at least  inadequate.  One often  hears,  for example,  that 
3.  Strictly speaking,  in traditional models money is not quite neutral when the private 
sector  holds  nominal  claims  on  outside  agents,  such  as  government  debt,  because 
changes  in the price level  then have wealth effects  on these  assets,  a point emphasized 
by  Metzler  (1951).  Even  leaving  aside  empirical  doubts  about the  importance  of  the 
Metzler effect  and theoretical questions  about its relevance  (with Ricardian equivalence 
the effect  goes  away),  this complication  can at most dampen the effect  of money on the 
price level,  but cannot eliminate  it. 
That said, many macroeconomists  bristle at the mention of monetary neutrality. The 
reason for their disdain is the widespread  belief  (which  I share) that because  prices are 
not perfectly flexible,  increases in the money supply often get reflected mainly in output 
rather than in prices.  However,  this has nothing to do with the puzzle  of a situation  in 
which increases in outside  money  can raise neither output nor prices,  and indeed  seem 
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the real problem is that Japan's banks are troubled,  and hence that the 
Bank of Japan cannot increase monetary aggregates; but outside money 
is supposed to raise prices regardless of the details of the transmission 
mechanism.  Aside  from the bad loans,  one  also  often  hears that cor- 
porations have too much debt,  that the service  sector is overregulated 
and inefficient,  and so on.  All of this may be true and may depress the 
economy  for  any  given  monetary  base,  but it does  not explain  why 
increases  in the monetary base should fail to raise prices,  or output, or 
both.  Recall  that the neutrality of money  is not a conditional  proposi- 
tion; it does  not depend on banks being in good financial shape, or the 
service sector being competitive,  or corporations not taking on too much 
debt.  Money  (which  is to say,  outside  money)  is  supposed  to be just 
plain neutral.4 
So how is a liquidity trap possible? The answer lies in a little-noticed 
escape  clause  in  the  standard argument for  monetary  neutrality:  an 
increase  in the money  supply in the current and allfuture  periods will 
raise prices in the same proportion. There is no corresponding argument 
that a rise in the money supply that is not expected  to be sustained will 
raise prices equiproportionally-or  indeed at all. 
In short, approaching the question from this high level of abstraction 
suggests  that a liquidity trap involves  a kind of credibility  problem.  A 
monetary expansion  that the market expects  to be  sustained  (that is, 
matched by equiproportional expansions  in all future periods)  will  al- 
ways  work,  whatever structural problems the economy  might have; if 
monetary expansion does not work-if  there is a liquidity trap-it  must 
be because the public does not expect it to be sustained. To firm up this 
insight,  one needs a specific  model. 
Money,  Interest,  and Prices:  A Minimalist Model 
Although  the idea of a liquidity trap is normally bound up with the 
IS-LM  model,  there are several  compelling  reasons  not to  start with 
that model  here.  Many macroeconomists  believe  that IS-LM is too ad 
4.  This summary of the standard remarks about Japan does not contradict my earlier 
assertion  that almost everyone  believes  that money  is approximately  neutral. My point 
here  is  that to  my  knowledge  nobody  has  made this  connection;  that is,  nobody  has 
noticed  that to say that monetary expansion  is ineffective  at raising output is equivalent 
to saying that it is ineffective  at fighting deflation,  and that this conflicts  with the almost 
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hoc to be worthy of serious consideration.  Some of us do not share that 
view  and continue to regard Hicks's  construction as a very useful heu- 
ristic  device.  Still,  it  is  important to  stress  that the  possibility  of  a 
liquidity trap does not depend on the ad hoc nature of the IS-LM model, 
that it can occur in a model that dots its microeconomic  i's and crosses 
its intertemporal t's.  Also,  as shown above,  a liquidity trap fundamen- 
tally involves  expectations  and credibility; using models that explicitly 
recognize  the intertemporal aspects of the problem helps to clarify this 
point.  Let me therefore move immediately  to an explicit  intertemporal 
model that establishes  relationships  among output, money,  prices,  and 
interest rates.  I then use  this model  as a base  for a series  of  thought 
experiments and extensions. 
Consider a one-good,  representative agent economy  (in which,  how- 
ever,  agents must purchase their consumption  from others).  Suppose, 
initially,  that the good is inelastically  supplied,  so that one can simply 
think of each agent as receiving  a given  endowment yt in each period. 
For concreteness,  the utility function  is assumed to take the form 
(1)  U-  Z  cl -P  Dt, 
ip 
where c is consumption within a period,  p is relative risk aversion,  and 
D is the discount factor. 
The simplest way to introduce money  into this model,  one that has 
the added advantage of avoiding  the suspicion  that the conclusions  are 
dictated by arbitrary assumptions  about the way money  enters utility, 
is  to  assume  a cash  in  advance  constraint.  Specifically,  within  each 
period agents are assumed  to go  through a two-stage  process.  At the 
beginning of each period there is a capital market, in which individuals 
can trade cash for one-period bonds, with nominal interest rate i,. Their 
consumption during the period is constrained by the cash with which 
they emerge from this trading: the nominal value of consumption,  Ptc,, 
cannot exceed  money  holdings,  Mt. After the capital market is held, 
each  individual  purchases  his  desired  consumption,  while  receiving 
cash from the sale of his own endowment. 
Government policy  can take two forms.  First, it is assumed that the 
central bank is  able to  engage  in open  market operations  during the 
beginning of period capital market, by buying or selling bonds. Second, 
at the end of the period the government can collect  or distribute lump 144  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1998 
sum taxes and transfers. The government must obey its own intertem- 
poral budget constraint,  which  takes into account the seignorage  that 
results from money creation. 
Analyzing  this model in general requires careful specification  of the 
budget constraints of both individuals  and the government,  and of in- 
tertemporal choices.  However,  if one makes some simplifying  assump- 
tions,  the model's  implications  can be derived with almost no algebra. 
Assume that from the second period onward, output (and therefore also 
consumption)  will  remain constant at a level  y*,  and that the govern- 
ment will  also hold the money supply constant at a level M*.  Then one 
can  immediately  guess  at the solution  from period two  on: the price 
level  will  remain constant  at P*  =  M*/y*,  and the interest rate will 
also  be  constant  at a rate it  =  (1  -  D)ID.  It is  straightforward to 
confirm that this is indeed an equilibrium: one plus the real interest rate 
equals  the ratio of marginal utility  in any two successive  periods; be- 
cause the nominal interest rate is positive,  individuals have an incentive 
to acquire only as much cash as they need,  so all money will indeed be 
spent on consumption. 
All  of  the  action,  then,  goes  into  determining  the price  level  and 
interest rate in the first period (I use letters without  subscripts to rep- 
resent first period output, consumption,  interest rate, and so forth). The 
first relationship comes  from the monetary side.  Under normal circum- 
stances-that  is, when the nominal interest rate is positive-individuals 
will  hold  no  more  cash  than they  need  to  make  their  consumption 
purchases.  Thus the cash in advance constraint will  be binding: Pc 
Py  M,  so that 
(2)  P  =  M/y. 
Under normal circumstances there is a simple proportional relationship 
between  the money  supply and the price level. 
The second relationship comes  from intertemporal choice.  By hold- 
ing one less  yen in period one,  an individual gives  up 1/P units of first 
period  consumption  but allows  himself  to consume  (1  +  i)/P*  addi- 
tional units in period two.  At an optimum,  this change must leave  him 
indifferent.  But the marginal utility of consumption in period one, given 
the assumed utility function,  is c-P; the marginal utility in period two 
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(3)  (c/c*)-P  =  DP(1  +  i)/P*, 
or, since consumption  must equal output in each period, 
P* 
(4)  1+  i  D-P (Y*/Y)P 
This  says  that the  higher  is  the  current price  level,  the  lower  is  the 
nominal interest rate. The easiest  way to think about this is to say that 
there is an equilibrium real interest rate, which the economy will deliver 
whatever the behavior of nominal prices.  Meanwhile,  since the future 
price level P*  is assumed held fixed, any rise in the current level creates 
expected deflation; hence higher P means lower i. 
The two relationships are shown in figure 1 as MM and CC, respec- 
tively;  as drawn, they intersect at point  1, simultaneously  determining 
the interest rate and the price level.  It is also immediately  apparent that 
an increase in the first period money supply will  shift MM to the right, 
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rate. While this is surely the normal case, however,  there is also another 
possibility. 
The Liquidity Trap in a Flexible  Price  Economy 
Suppose that one starts with an economy  in the equilibrium described 
by point 1 in figure 1 and imagines an initial open market operation that 
increases the first period money supply. (Throughout, one imagines that 
the  money  supply  remains  unchanged  from  period  two  onward-or 
equivalently,  that the central bank will do whatever is necessary to keep 
the  price  level  stable  from  period  two  onward.)  Initially,  as  I have 
shown above,  this operation will increase the price level  and reduce the 
interest  rate.  And  such  a  monetary  expansion  can  clearly  drive  the 
economy  down the CC curve as far as point 2.  But what happens if the 
money  supply is increased still further, so that the intersection  of MM 
and CC is at point 3,  with a negative  nominal interest rate? 
The answer clearly  is that the interest rate cannot go negative,  be- 
cause money would then dominate bonds as an asset. Therefore it must 
be that any increase  in the money  supply beyond the level  that would 
push the interest rate to zero is simply substituted for zero interest bonds 
in individual portfolios  (the bonds being purchased by the central bank 
in its open market operation!),  with no further effect  on either the price 
level  or the interest rate. Because  spending is no longer constrained by 
money,  the MM curve becomes  irrelevant; the economy  stays at point 
2,  no matter how large the money  supply. 
Note that the interest rate at point 2 is zero only on one-period bonds; 
it would  not be  zero  on  longer  term bonds,  such  as consols.  This  is 
important if one is trying to map the model  onto the current situation 
in Japan, or for that matter in the United States during the 1930s: long 
rates in Japan are still  positive,  but short-term rates are indeed  very 
close  to zero. 
A  good  way  to  think  about  what  happens  when  money  becomes 
irrelevant under such circumstances  is to bear in mind that one is hold- 
ing the long-run money supply fixed at M*,  and therefore also the long- 
run price  level  at P*.  So  when the central bank increases  the current 
money  supply,  it lowers  the expected  rate of  money  growth,  M*/M, 
and also (if it does succeed  in raising the price level)  the expected  rate 
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economy  will have the same real interest rate whatever the central bank 
does.  Since the nominal interest rate cannot become negative,  however, 
the economy  has a minimum rate of  inflation,  or a maximum rate of 
deflation. 
Now  suppose that the central bank in effect  tries to impose  a rate of 
deflation  that exceeds  this  maximum,  by  making  the  current money 
supply,  M,  large  relative  to  the  future supply,  M*.  In this  case  the 
economy  will  simply  cease  to  be  cash-constrained,  and  any  excess 
money  will  have no effect:  the rate of deflation will  be the maximum 
consistent  with a zero nominal rate, and no more. 
This may seem a silly thought experiment. Why would a central bank 
try to  impose  massive  deflation?  But the  maximum  rate of  deflation 
need not be large,  or even positive.  Suppose that the required real rate 
of  interest  is  negative;  then the  economy  "needs"  inflation,  and an 
attempt by the central bank to achieve price stability will lead to a zero 
nominal interest rate and excess  cash holdings. 
The condition  under which the required real interest rate is negative 
is straightforward in this simple endowment economy.  Market clearing 
will  require a negative  real interest rate if the marginal utility of  con- 
sumption in period two is greater than that in period one,  which will be 
the case  if the economy's  future output is expected  to be sufficiently 
less  than  its  current output.  Specifically,  given  the  assumed  utility 
function,  the required real interest rate is negative  if 
(5)  (y/y*)P  <D. 
This condition  might seem peculiar.  After all,  one normally thinks of 
economies  as growing  rather than shrinking.  One possible  answer in- 
volves  an equity premium, another involves  demography; but I reserve 
this issue for discussion  below. 
In a flexible  price economy,  the necessity  of a negative real interest 
rate does not cause unemployment.  This conclusion  may surprise econ- 
omists who recall the tortured historical debate about the liquidity trap, 
much of  which  focused  on  whether  wage  and price  flexibility  were 
effective  means of restoring full employment.  In this model the problem 
does not arise, but for a reason that is a bit unusual: the economy deflates 
now  in order to provide  inflation later.  That is,  if the current money 
supply is so large compared with the future supply that the nominal rate 
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public then expects the price level to rise, which provides the necessary 
negative  real interest rate.  And  to repeat,  this  fall  in the price  level 
occurs  regardless  of  the  current money  supply,  because  any  excess 
money will  simply be hoarded, rather than added to spending. 
At this point one has a version of the liquidity trap: money becomes 
irrelevant at the margin.5 But aside from frustrating the central bank- 
which finds itself  presiding over inflation no matter what it does-this 
trap has no adverse real consequences.  To turn the analysis  into a real 
problem,  in  both  senses,  one  must  introduce  some  kind  of  nominal 
rigidity. 
The Hicksian Liquidity Trap 
Suppose that the consumption  good is produced,  rather than simply 
appearing, with a maximum productive capacity yf in period one.  And 
suppose,  also, that this productive capacity need not be fully employed. 
In particular, this paper assumes  simply  that the price level  in period 
one  is predetermined,  so that the economy  now  acquires a Keynesian 
feel,  and monetary policy  can affect  output. In period two and subse- 
quently,  output will  still be assumed to take on the value y*. 
In this sticky price world,  the levels  of period one consumption  and 
output must still be equal, but output adjusts to consumption rather than 
the other way  around. Given  the utility  function,  and the assumption 
that consumption  will  be y* in period two,  one can immediately  write 
an expression for current real consumption,  which becomes the IS curve 
determining real output: 
(6)  c  =  y  =  y*(P*/DP)I/P(l  +  i)-I/P 
5.  Some  commentators  on an earlier draft of this paper seemed  to believe  that this 
possibility  of  monetary  irrelevance  depends  on the assumption  that the central bank is 
expected  to defend  a future price-level  target,  as opposed  to an inflation rate target- 
that money  becomes  irrelevant only  because  the  central  bank creates  expectations  of 
future deflation.  But when the equilibrium real interest rate is negative,  the liquidity trap 
emerges  even  if all the central bank wants is to keep prices stable.  And the assumption 
that the central bank has an inflation target leads to even more paradoxical results.  Since 
the economy  needs  inflation,  attempting to keep  the rate of  change  of  prices  constant 
means that there is no equilibrium price level:  prices simply  fall without limit. 
If one  makes  the more realistic  assumption  that prices  are downward  sticky  in the 
short to  medium  run,  this  paradox disappears.  In this  case,  a committment  to  price 
stability,  measured either by a predetermined target level or by inflation from the current 
level,  will  still  imply a liquidity  trap when the full-employment  real rate is negative. Paul R. Krugman  149 
Figure 2. Relationships  between  Output and the Interest  Rate 
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Souice  Authoi's  model  as described  in text 
Figure 2 illustrates the joint determination of the interest rate and output 
in this case.  The IS curve,  as just indicated,  shows how output will  be 
determined by consumption demand, which is decreasing in the interest 
rate. Meanwhile,  as long  as the nominal  interest rate is positive,  the 
cash in advance constraint will  be binding,  giving  the MM curve 
(7)  y  =  Mip. 
Increasing the money supply can now increase output, up to a point; 
specifically,  up to point 2.  But what if productive capacity  is at point 
3? The  same  argument as  in  the  previous  section  applies:  since  the 
nominal interest rate cannot become  negative,  any increase  in money 
beyond the level  that drives the rate to zero will  simply be substituted 
for bonds,  with no effect  on spending.  And therefore no open market 
operation, however large,  can get the economy  to full employment.  In 
short, the economy  is in a classic  Hicksian liquidity trap. 
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bility  is that P is high compared with P*; that is,  people  expect  defla- 
tion,  so  that even  a zero  nominal  rate is  a high  real rate.  The  other 
possibility,  however,  is that even if prices are expected  to be stable, yf 
is high compared with the future-or  equivalently,  people's  expected 
future real income  is  low  compared with the amount of  consumption 
needed to use today's capacity.  In that case,  it may take a negative real 
interest rate to persuade people  to spend enough now,  and with down- 
wardly inflexible  prices that may not be possible. 
To put it yet another way,  closer  to the language  of applied macro- 
economics,  if people have low expectations  about their future incomes, 
even  with  a zero  interest  rate they  may  want to  save  more  than the 
economy  can  absorb.  (In this  case,  the  economy  cannot  absorb any 
savings; I address that point below.)  And therefore,  no matter what the 
central bank does  with the current money  supply,  it cannot reflate the 
economy  sufficiently  to restore full employment. 
So  I have now  shown  that a fully  specified  model,  fudging  neither 
the role of  money  nor the necessity  of  making intertemporal choices, 
can indeed  generate  a liquidity  trap. The model  does,  however,  omit 
some  important aspects  of  standard macroeconomic  models.  Perhaps 
most notable,  it has no investment,  no foreign trade or capital mobility, 
and no financial intermediation,  so that all money  is outside.  Can the 
same story be told if these elements  are introduced? 
Investment,  Productive  Capital,  and Tobin's q 
One way of stating the liquidity trap problem is to say that it occurs 
when  the equilibrium  real interest rate-the  rate at which  saving  and 
investment  would  be  equal  at potential  output-is  negative.  An  im- 
mediate  question  is how  this can happen in an economy  in which,  in 
contrast with  the  simple  endowment  economy  described  above,  pro- 
ductive  investment  can take place and the marginal product of capital, 
while  it can be low,  can hardly be negative. 
One answer that may be extremely  important in practice is the exis- 
tence  of  an equity  premium.  If the equity  premium is  as high  as the 
historic U.S.  average,  the economy  could find itself  in a liquidity trap 
even if the rate of return on physical capital is as high as 5 or 6 percent. 
A further answer is that the rate of return on investment depends not 
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the expected rate of change of that price. An economy  in which Tobin's 
q is  expected  to decline  could  offer  investors  a negative  real rate of 
return despite having a positive  marginal product of capital. 
This point is easiest  to make if one considers  an economy  with not 
capital  but land  (which  can  serve  as  a sort of  metaphor for  durable 
capital); and also if one temporarily departs from the basic framework 
to consider an overlapping generations model,  in which each generation 
works only  in its first period of  life  but consumes  only  in its second. 
Let A be the stock of land, and Lt be the labor force in period t, defined 
as  the  number of  individuals  born in  that period.  Given  the  special 
assumption that the young  do not consume  during their working years 
but use all their income to buy land from the old, one has a very simple 
determination of qt, the price of land in terms of output: it must be true 
that 
(8)  qtAt  =  wt  Lt, 
where w, is the marginal product of labor. So in this special  setup, q is 
not a forward-looking variable; it depends only on the size of the current 
labor force. 
The expected rate of return on purchases of land, however,  is forward 
looking.  Let Rt be the marginal product of land, and rt  the rate of return 
for the current younger generation.  Then 
(9)  1?+  rt =  R,  ?  q+ 
qt 
Now  suppose  that demographers project that the next generation  will 
be  smaller  than the  current one,  so  that the  labor force,  and hence 
(given  elastic  demand for labor) the real price  of  land,  will  decline. 
Then even  though land has a positive  marginal product,  the expected 
return from investing  in land can,  in principle,  be negative. 
This  is  a highly  stylized  example,  which  begs  many  questions. 
Nevertheless,  it at least establishes that a liquidity trap can occur despite 
the existence  of productive investment  projects. 
International Mobility of Goods and Capital 
Many writers on Japan have assumed that one solution to the apparent 
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to invest  the excess  savings  abroad. In a recent influential study,  An- 
drew Smithers suggests that over the long term, Japan should run capital 
account deficits  (and hence  current account surpluses)  of no less  than 
10 percent of GDP.6  The general view seems to be that an open economy 
can  always  extricate  itself  from  a liquidity  trap as long  as  there are 
profitable investment  opportunities overseas.  The main problem is the 
political  one  of  persuading  the rest of  the world to  accept  the corre- 
sponding trade surpluses. 
Unfortunately,  the economics  of capital export are not as favorable 
as this analysis  suggests.  The limited  integration of markets for goods 
and services  turns out  to  prevent  capital  flows  from  equalizing  real 
interest rates in terms of domestic consumption,  even when the mobility 
of capital itself is perfect. The fact is that in large economies  like Japan 
or the United  States,  the bulk of  employment  and value  added is  in 
goods  and services  that remain nontradable despite  modern communi- 
cations and transportation technology.  And this large nontradable share 
may well  mean that capital export,  even  at a zero interest rate, is not 
enough to escape  a liquidity  trap. 
This  argument can be  made  in the language  of  conventional  open 
economy  IS-LM  models.  In such  models  it is  usual  to  tie  down  the 
exchange  rate by assuming  that the market expects  the real exchange 
rate to return to some  normal value  in the long  run. The current real 
exchange  rate  is  then  determined  off  this  long-run  rate via  the  real 
interest differential between domestic and foreign bonds. So a monetary 
expansion  that lowers  nominal,  and hence real,  interest rates at home 
will produce a real depreciation,  and this real depreciation will increase 
net exports  at any given  level  of  output.  However,  there is a limit to 
the size of the stimulus that this depreciation can generate: because the 
real exchange  rate is expected  to revert to its normal level,  even a zero 
interest rate will  produce only  a finite real depreciation.  If trade is  a 
small share of GDP and if the price elasticities  of imports and exports 
are also fairly small-both  of which conditions  are true in econometric 
models  of large economies,  if not in reality-even  near perfect capital 
mobility  may provide only limited extra scope for monetary expansion. 
But should one believe  this story? While the open economy  IS-LM 
model may be a highly useful heuristic device  for thinking about short- 
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and medium-run macroeconomic  issues,  many economists  doubt that it 
is really trustworthy, especially  in considering  such fundamental ques- 
tions as the scope  for international capital flows.  And in any case,  the 
thrust of this paper is to remove the stigma of the ad hoc nature of the 
liquidity  trap concept.  It may therefore be helpful  to supplement  this 
conventional  view  with a restatement in terms of a variant of my basic 
intertemporal model. 
Consider a somewhat modified version of the basic model,  in which 
the economy  produces and consumes  two goods,  one tradable (T) and 
the other nontradable (N).  Utility  takes the form 
(10)  U  =  , DtC-,  Cl-TcI 
In general,  one  would  want to give  the economy  a transformation 
curve between  N and T at any point in time.  For simplicity,  I assume 
that the transformation curve is right-angled; that is,  the economy  re- 
ceives  exogenous  endowments  of the two goods  in each period. It can, 
however,  borrow and lend on world markets at a given real interest rate 
rT in terms of the tradable good,  so consumption  of that good need not 
be the same as production. 
Does  this assumed perfect capital mobility  therefore imply that the 
domestic real interest rate must equal the world rate? Not if inflation is 
measured in terms of either the nontraded good or a consumption basket 
that includes both traded and nontraded goods.  This is most easily  seen 
by considering  the special  case  in which  p is equal to one; that is,  in 
which equation  10 takes the special  form 
(1 1)  U  =  Et  Dt[  ln(cT,)  +  (1  -  T)ln(cNt)]- 
In equation  11,  utility  becomes  separable between  tradables and non- 
tradables. For each good,  the relationship between consumption growth 
and the real interest  rate must  obey  the rule  1  +  r  =  D-'(ct+1/ct). 
Whereas in the tradable sector relative  consumption  is determined by 
the exogenous  real interest rate, however,  in the nontraded sector (as- 
suming  full  employment)  it  will  be  the  other  way  around: because 
consumption  of  nontradables must equal production,  the real interest 
rate in terms of  nontraded goods  will  have  to  adjust to  the  path of 
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real interest rate in terms of  nontraded goods  will  be  negative,  even 
with perfect capital mobility; and if the traded share in the consumption 
basket is small enough,  the overall domestic  real rate may be negative 
even  if the world real rate is positive. 
Now introduce the possibility  of unemployment,  by making the nom- 
inal price of  nontradables downwardly  rigid,  and consider  the effects 
of  a temporary monetary  expansion-that  is,  one  that increases  the 
money supply in the first period but does not change expectations  about 
money supplies  in later periods.  Such a monetary expansion  will lower 
the nominal  interest rate, with different effects  on the two sectors.  In 
tradables,  the real interest rate is tied down by world capital markets, 
so there must now be expected  deflation in traded goods prices.  But the 
future  price  is  also  tied  down  by  the  assumption  that the  monetary 
expansion  is  only  temporary.  So  the current price  of  tradables must 
rise,  in order to allow  for the subsequent fall.  There must therefore be 
a nominal depreciation  of the exchange  rate. 
The situation in nontradables will be exactly  as in the economy  as a 
whole  in the closed  economy  model: the lower  nominal rate will  also 
be a lower real rate, and both consumption and production will increase. 
The important point is that both for the exchange  rate and for non- 
tradable production, the zero constraint on the nominal interest rate can 
be binding.  That is, even at a zero interest rate, the output increase and 
the nominal depreciation will have finite magnitudes-and  the economy 
may not be able to go all the way to full employment. 
Incidentally,  in  this  log  utility  case,  monetary  expansion  has  no 
effect  on the current account.  This is so because the separability of the 
utility function  means that consumers  in effect  must make completely 
separate decisions  on tradable and nontradable consumption  over time; 
and since the real interest rate on tradables does not change,  there is no 
reallocation  between  present and future consumption  of  those  goods. 
This is obviously  an artifact of the assumption that p is equal to one; I 
discuss  the consequences  of larger p below. 
Financial  Intermediation  and Monetary Aggregates 
Attempts to make sense  of the origins  and persistence  of the Great 
Depression  in the United  States hinge crucially  on how one interprets 
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Figure 3. U.S. Monetary  Trends,  1929-39 
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of  broader aggregates  during the period.  Figure 3 shows  the familiar 
picture presented  slightly  differently  from the standard representation 
(with both monetary base and M2 presented as indexes  constructed so 
that 1929 equals  100).  It shows that monetary base actually rose during 
the early years of  slump and continued  to rise steeply  throughout the 
1930s.  By  contrast,  M2 fell  by more than a third and did not surpass 
its  1929  level  until  1939.  These  basic  facts  underlie  two  influential 
views  of the Depression.  One,  suggested  by Friedman and Schwartz, 
is that a broad aggregate  like M2 is the proper measure of the money 
supply,  that the Depression  occurred because  the Fed allowed  broad 
money to fall so much,  and that recovery was so long delayed because 
the needed  increase  in broad money  was  equally  long  delayed.7  The 
other view,  associated with Ben Bernanke and Russell Cooper and Dean 
Corbae, among others,  is that the dramatic decline  in the money  mul- 
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tiplier was the signature of a major episode  of financial disintermedia- 
tion;  and that this  disintermediation,  which  may be  thought  of  more 
nearly as a supply-side  than a demand-side phenomenon,  was the cause 
of the sustained slump.8 However,  monetary explanations  of the Great 
Depression  have  been  criticized,  most  notably  by  Peter Temin,  who 
suggests that the decline in monetary aggregates was a result rather than 
a cause  of  the slump,  and perhaps could  not have been prevented  by 
the Federal Reserve.9 
Since the Depression  is the main historical example for liquidity trap 
economics,  and since  one  quite  often  hears  similar  arguments made 
about contemporary Japan, it is important to ask how  financial inter- 
mediaries  and  monetary  aggregates  fit  into  the  liquidity  trap story. 
Fortunately, it is quite easy to sketch out how this could be done,  using 
a framework  that  might  be  described  as  "cash  in  advance  meets 
Diamond-Dybvig"  (a formal exposition  of this framework is given  in 
appendix A).  In their classic  paper, Douglas  Diamond and Philip Dyb- 
vig  introduce a demand for liquidity  by making individuals  uncertain 
about their own  consumption  needs;  only  after they have made com- 
mitments  to  illiquid  investments  do  they  discover  whether  they  are 
"type  one"  consumers,  who derive utility from consumption  in period 
one but not period two, or "type two"  consumers,  who do the reverse. 10 
This dilemma can be resolved by a class of financial intermediaries that 
allow  individuals  to withdraw funds on demand,  but are able to make 
illiquid  investments  because  the number of  early withdrawals  is pre- 
dictable.  Although  Diamond  and Dybvig  are mainly  concerned  with 
showing  how such a system  could be vulnerable to self-fulfilling  bank 
runs,  one  can  also  use  their  approach as  a device  for  putting  inter- 
mediates  and monetary aggregates  into the basic model of this paper. 
To  do  this,  return to  a  one-good  endowment  economy,  but  now 
suppose that at the beginning  of each period a three-step process takes 
place,  as follows:  (1) individuals  trade currency for bonds in a capital 
market  and  are  also  able  to  make  deposits  at  a class  of  banks, 
(2)  individuals  discover  whether they derive utility from consuming  in 
the current period,  (3)  those  who  do  want to  consume  withdraw the 
necessary  cash from their bank accounts. 
8.  See Bernanke  (1994); Cooper  and Corbae  (1997). 
9.  See Temin (1976). 
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The determination of the real interest rate is somewhat more complex 
in this setup,  because  while  the representative  agent assumption  may 
hold ex ante, it does not hold ex post.  However,  given the equilibrium 
real rate, it is straightforward to see what must happen in the financial 
sector.  As long as the nominal interest rate is positive,  individuals  will 
have no incentive  to hold on to cash; instead,  they will deposit enough 
money  in their bank accounts to cover their cash needs  if they do turn 
out to be type one consumers.  Banks,  in turn, will have to hold enough 
of the deposits  they receive  in cash to cover  such withdrawals; again, 
given  a positive  nominal interest rate, they will  hold no more than the 
minimum required, putting the rest in bonds. So at the beginning of the 
period,  a monetary  aggregate  defined  as currency  plus  deposits  will 
actually  consist  of  no  currency,  but  a volume  of  deposits  that is  a 
multiple  of the base money  held as reserves.  And any increase in that 
base will,  under conditions  of full employment,  lead to an equal pro- 
portional increase in both deposits  and the price level. 
But  if  the  nominal  interest  rate is  driven  to  zero,  consumers  and 
banks  will  become  indifferent  between  holding  monetary  base  and 
bonds-and  consumers  will  also  be indifferent between  both of these 
and bank deposits.  Exactly what happens to an increase in the monetary 
base under these  conditions  is indeterminate: it could  be absorbed by 
consumers,  who might substitute cash for either bonds or bank deposits 
in their portfolios;  or the extra base could be absorbed by banks, which 
will  simply  hold excess  reserves.  Of these three possibilities,  only the 
one in which consumers substitute cash for bonds (rather than deposits) 
will have any effect  on a currency-plus-deposits  measure of the money 
supply.  Either a substitution of cash for deposits  or an addition of base 
money  to reserves  will  reduce bank credit but leave  the monetary ag- 
gregate  unchanged.  And  in any case,  there will  be no effects  on the 
price level,  nor on output if prices are sticky. 
Applying  what one of my colleagues  calls  the principle of insignifi- 
cant reason,  one  may surmise  that an increase  in monetary base  will 
lead to substitution  in all three directions.  This means that under liq- 
uidity trap conditions,  such a base expansion  will  (1) expand a broad 
aggregate  slightly,  but only  because  the public  holds  more currency; 
(2) actually reduce deposits,  because  some of that currency substitutes 
for deposits; and (3) reduce bank credit even more, because banks will 
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The implications  of this thought experiment should be obvious.  If an 
economy  is truly in a liquidity  trap, failure of broad monetary aggre- 
gates  to expand  is not a sign  of  insufficiently  expansionary  monetary 
policy:  the  central  bank  may  simply  be  unable  to  achieve  such  an 
expansion  because  additional base  is either added to bank reserves  or 
held by the public in place of bank deposits.  However,  this inability to 
expand broad money  does  not mean that the essential  problem lies  in 
the banking system; it is to be expected even if the banks are in perfectly 
fine shape. 
The point is important and bears repeating: under liquidity trap con- 
ditions,  the  normal  expectation  is  that an increase  in  high-powered 
money  will  have little  effect  on broad aggregates,  and may even  lead 
to a decline  in bank deposits  and a larger decline  in bank credit.  This 
seemingly  perverse result is part of the looking-glass  logic  of the situ- 
ation,  irrespective  of the problems of the banks, per se. 
Fiscal  Policy 
One can now consider possible  policy  responses  to an economy  in a 
liquidity trap. The classic  Keynesian  answer is fiscal expansion,  which 
clearly  does  work  in  an  IS-LM  framework.  How  does  it  look  in  a 
modernized  version of liquidity  trap theory? 
The framework developed  above  is strongly  biased  against finding 
any useful  role for fiscal policy,  because  the representative  agent,  in- 
tertemporal optimization  approach implies Ricardian equivalence.  This 
bias does  not represent an empirical judgment:  it is an accidental  by- 
product of modeling  decisions  made for the sake of simplicity  on other 
fronts.  True,  a number of  commentators  have  suggested  (mainly  be- 
cause of the apparent ineffectiveness  of Japanese efforts at fiscal stim- 
ulus to date) that Japan may come closer to Ricardian equivalence  than 
most  countries,  and it is  interesting,  at least  as an exercise,  to think 
through the  implications  of  such  equivalence."I  But  in reality,  fiscal 
11.  Suppose  that one really believed that  Japan  was Ricardian  equivalent,  or nearly 
so. The first  and most obvious implication  is that changes in taxes and transfers  should 
have no effect. In the practical  discussion of Japanese  policy, there has been much 
concern over whether tax cuts should be temporary  or "permanent." If one really 
believes in Ricardian  equivalence, this discussion is irrelevant,  unless one believes that 
a permanent  tax cut will constrain  future  government  purchases  of goods and services. 
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policy would surely have some impact. Two questions about that impact 
follow,  one qualitative and one quantitative. 
The qualitative question  is whether a temporary fiscal stimulus can 
have permanent effects.  If current income  has very strong impacts on 
spending,  so that the marginal propensity to spend (consumption  plus 
investment)  is actually greater than one over some range, there can be 
multiple equilibria. A liquidity trap may therefore represent a low-level 
equilibrium,  and a sufficiently  large temporary fiscal expansion  could 
jolt  the economy  out of  that equilibrium  into a region  where conven- 
tional monetary policy  worked again. 
It seems  to be part of the folk wisdom  in macroeconomics  that this 
is in fact how the Great Depression  came to an end: the massive  one- 
time fiscal jolt from the war pushed the economy  into a more favorable 
equilibrium.  However,  Christina Romer contends that most of the out- 
put gap created during 1929-33  had been eliminated  before there was 
any significant  fiscal stimulus. 12  She argues that the main explanation 
government expenditures-for  example,  public works projects-should  be exactly  one: 
that is, such projects will  generate exactly  as much additional income  as the government 
spends.  This may be seen directly,  by the fact that in the basic model current consump- 
tion is tied down  by the Euler condition;  if current policy  cannot either raise expected 
future consumption or change the real interest rate, it cannot change current consumption. 
Alternatively, note that the extra income generated by government spending will be matched 
by an exactly equal present-discounted value of future tax liabilities.  Either way,  govern- 
ment spending will not generate any second-round increase in private spending. 
A third point,  which  has not been  appreciated in some  recent discussion,  is that if 
temporary tax cuts will  not raise consumption,  any other policy  that can be reinterpreted 
as  a temporary tax  cut  or  transfer will  be  equally  ineffectual.  For example,  several 
foreign commentators have suggested  that the Japanese government  promote consump- 
tion by issuing  vouchers  that must be spent within  some  short period.  But individuals 
could presumably use the vouchers  for purchases that they would otherwise  have made 
with cash; and if they take the future tax liability  implied by the vouchers  into account, 
they will do so,  with no increase  in spending. 
A surprising corollary  is that what is  normally regarded as the most extreme  infla- 
tionary monetary policy  possible,  a helicopter  drop of  cash,  is just  as ineffective  in a 
liquidity trap as an open  market operation.  Since  in a liquidity  trap money  and bonds 
are perfect substitutes,  it is no different from a lump sum transfer of bonds to the public, 
which,  by Ricardian equivalence,  has no effect. 
These extreme results are, of course,  implications  of the strong assumption of com- 
pletely rational, forward-looking  consumption  behavior. 
12.  Romer (1992).  Significant  fiscal stimulus began in 1941 (before Pearl Harbor- 
a massive  military buildup was  already under way).  One's  assessment  of  whether  the 
economy had largely recovered from the Great Depression  prior to the onset of massive 
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of that expansion  was a sharp decline  in real interest rates,  which  she 
attributes to monetary policy  (although most of the decline  in her esti- 
mate of the real interest rate is actually due to changes  in the inflation 
rate rather than the nominal interest rate). Indeed, Romer estimates that 
for most of the recovery period ex ante real rates were sharply negative, 
ranging between  -5  and  -  10  percent.13 
My point is that the end of the Depression,  which is the usual, indeed 
perhaps the sole,  motivating example for the view that a one-time fiscal 
stimulus can produce sustained recovery,  does not actually appear to fit 
the story line too well.  Much,  though by no means all,  of the recovery 
from that particular liquidity  trap seems  to have depended on inflation 
expectations  that made real interest rates substantially negative. 
If  temporary fiscal  stimulus  does  not jolt  the  economy  out  of  the 
doldrums,  however,  a recovery  strategy  based  on  fiscal  expansion 
would  have to continue  the stimulus  over an extended  period.  Which 
raises  the quantitative  question  of  how  much stimulus  is  needed,  for 
how long-and  whether the consequences  in terms of government debt 
are acceptable. 
Credibility and Monetary Policy 
It may seem  strange to have a subsection  mentioning  monetary pol- 
icy,  given  that up to this point the paper has stressed the ineffectuality 
of such policy  in a liquidity trap. However,  as I noted at the beginning, 
had  risen 70 percent  from  its 1933 level, but it was only 11 percent  above its 1929 level, 
so that a significant  output  gap surely remained.  The "half full or half empty" issue is 
apparent  in the contrast  between  Romer's  discussion and that of Gordon  (1988). While 
Gordon  views the U.S. economy in 1939 as stuck, Romer  emphasizes  growth  rates of 
more than 8 percent  in 1939 and 1940. 
13. For  this calculation,  Romer  uses commercial  paper  rates,  which  did decline  some- 
what  even in nominal  terms.  However,  the spread  between  commercial  paper  and  Treasury 
bills is presumably  to some extent endogenous.  T-bill rates averaged  0.515 percent  in 
1933-roughly the same as Japanese  rates  today. While they did fall to virtually  zero by 
the end of the decade, any fall in real rates  using this measure  of nominal  interest  would 
be almost  entirely  dominated  by changes  in inflation  expectations. 
Indeed, seen through  the lens of the analysis  in the present  paper,  Romer's  evidence 
seems to suggest a somewhat  different  interpretation  of events. One might  think  of her 
findings  as showing that the real expansion  of the economy-and  the associated  rise in 
prices-was  the result  of a rise in inflation  expectations,  which reduced  real interest  rates 
when  nominal  rates  were  already  at the floor.  Without  this  expected  inflation,  the  expansion 
of monetary  base that  Romer  emphasizes  would  have been ineffectual. Paul R. Krugman  161 
only  temporary  monetary  expansions  are ineffectual.  If  a  monetary 
expansion  is perceived  to be permanent, it will  raise prices  (in a full- 
employment model) or output (if current prices are predetermined). The 
mechanism  may  be  seen  immediately  from  equation  6:  a rise  in the 
expected  future price level P* will  shift out the IS curve in the current 
period. 
The ineffectuality  of monetary policy  in a liquidity trap is really the 
result  of  a looking-glass  version  of  the standard credibility  problem: 
monetary policy does not work because the public expects that whatever 
the central bank may do now,  given  the chance,  it will  revert to type 
and stabilize  prices  near their current level.  If  the  central  bank can 
credibly promise to be irresponsible-that  is, convince  the market that 
it  will  in  fact  allow  prices  to  rise  sufficiently-it  can  bootstrap  the 
economy  out of the trap. Again,  although she does not put it this way, 
Romer's  analysis of the U.S.  recovery over  1933-41  suggests  that just 
such a bootstrap process  was the main cause of the growth in output. 
Proposals for "managed  inflation,"  first widely  aired a few  months 
ago,  have  since  drawn a number of  questions.'4  One may as well  go 
through those most frequently asked,  and their answers. 
Why inflation-isn't  an end to deflation good  enough?  In terms of 
the analysis given above, price stability is not an option for an economy 
in  a liquidity  trap. The  economy  needs  inflation,  because  it needs  a 
negative  real  interest  rate; the  deflationary  pressures  actually  being 
manifested represent the economy  trying to generate that needed infla- 
tion by reducing  current prices  compared with the future price  level. 
The only way to avoid lowering the current level is to raise the expected 
future level. 
Isn't inflation a bad thing? Again, in terms of my analysis,  a liquidity 
trap economy  is "naturally"  an economy  with inflation; if prices were 
completely  flexible,  it would  get that inflation regardless of monetary 
policy,  so  a deliberately  inflationary policy  is remedying  a distortion 
rather than creating one.  One might also arrive at the recommendation 
of inflation by a quite different route: Friedman's famous theory of the 
optimum  quantity  of  money.'5  Although  he  says  that the  economy 
should deflate at the rate of time preference,  the proper interpretation 
14.  Managed inflation  gained  widespread  attention following  a posting  on the au- 
thor's worldwide  web site,  "Japan's Trap,"  in May  1998. 
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of this logic  is that the economy  should deflate at the market-clearing 
real rate of interest.  For a liquidity  trap economy,  where that market- 
clearing rate is negative,  this means a negative  rate of deflation-that 
is , inflation. 
Won't expected  inflation produce  perverse  incentives?  In terms of 
the models,  at least,  a fall  in the real  interest rate achieved  through 
expected  inflation is identical  in its effects  to one produced through a 
fall in nominal interest rates, when that is possible.  There is no reason 
in principle to expect  the increase in spending generated by a commit- 
ment to inflation to be any different in character from that generated by 
a conventional  monetary expansion  in an economy  that starts with pos- 
itive  nominal rates. 
Won't an inflationary policy  lead  to a plunge  in the exchange  rate 
and  become  a  beggar  thy neighbor  policy  at  the rest  of  the world's 
expense?  Because  expected  inflation plays the same role in a liquidity 
trap economy  as do interest rate reductions under more normal circum- 
stances,  inflating  one's  way  out of  a trap is  no more (and no less)  a 
beggar thy neighbor policy  than any monetary expansion under flexible 
exchange rates. But what is the beggar thy neighbor aspect of monetary 
policy,  anyway? 
In the traditional open economy  IS-LM model developed  by Robert 
Mundell  and Marcus  Fleming,  and also  in  large-scale  econometric 
models,  monetary expansion  unambiguously  leads to currency depre- 
ciation.16 But there are two  offsetting  effects  on  the current account 
balance.  On one  side,  the currency depreciation  tends to increase  net 
exports; on the other side, the expansion of the domestic economy tends 
to increase  imports.  For what it is worth,  policy  experiments  on such 
models  seem to suggest that these effects  very nearly cancel each other 
out.  Table  1 presents estimates  from the comprehensive,  if somewhat 
elderly,  comparison  of  eleven  models  by Jeffrey  Frankel. 17 For each 
model,  it shows  the second  year effects  on the exchange  rate and the 
current account of a monetary expansion  sufficient to raise real United 
States  GNP by  1 percent.  The exchange  rate impacts  are substantial, 
the current account  impacts  negligible.  To the extent  that these  esti- 
mates are correct, they suggest that in a large economy  with fairly small 
16.  Mundell  (1963);  Fleming  (1962). 
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Table 1. Second Year  Effects on the U.S. Exchange  Rate and Current Account  after 
a Monetary  Expansion  to Raise Real GNP by 1 Percent 
Percent 
Modela  Exchange  rate  Current  accountb 
DRI  -8.1  -0.02 
EEC  -4.0  -0.07 
EPA  -5.3  -0.03 
LINK  -2.3  -0.01 
LIVERPOOL  -39.0  -3.1 
MCM  -4.0  -0.05 
MINIMOD  -5.7  -0.07 
MSG  -6.7  -0.21 
OECD  -1.6  -0.13 
VAR  -7.6  -0.04 
WHARTON  -1.4  -0.17 
Summary  statistic 
Median  -5.3  -0.03 
Source: Frankel (1988). 
a. Models are fully identified by Frankel. 
b. As a percentage of GNP. 
trade shares, expected  inflation will produce a significant currency de- 
preciation but have small impact on the current account.18 
I have been trying to get beyond  the IS-LM model,  however.  How 
does the result look in an intertemporal open economy  model? Assume 
the utility  function  given  in equation  10,  exogenous  output of  traded 
goods,  and sticky prices or excess  capacity  in the nontraded sector.  If 
the nominal interest rate is positive,  ordinary monetary policy can raise 
output of  the  nontraded good;  if  the economy  is  in  a liquidity  trap, 
expectations  of future monetary expansion can achieve the same result. 
18. In the case of Japan,  many  people  want  the economy  to act as a "locomotive"- 
to run much smaller current  account surpluses, thereby aiding the recovery of neigh- 
boring  economies. Perhaps  the important  point  to make  here  is that  even a large  recovery 
in Japanese  output  would have only a small locomotive effect, unless accompanied  by 
a substantial  strengthening  of the yen. Typical estimates of the short-run  income elas- 
ticity of import  demand  are around  2; given Japan's  import  share in GDP of approxi- 
mately  0. 1, this means that a 5 percentage  point recovery  would, at an unchanged  real 
exchange  rate, reduce  Japan's  surplus  by roughly 1 percent  of GDP (some $35 billion). 
And  only a fraction  of this swing would  come vis-a-vis the troubled  emerging  economies 
of Asia. The only way to get a much larger locomotive effect would be for Japan  to 
pursue  a Reagan-style  expansion, in which the exchange rate appreciates  substantially. 
However, given that Japan  is having great difficulty achieving any type of recovery, 
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Table  2.  Beggar Thy Neighbor  Coefficients 
7 
p  0.2  0.3  0.4 
2  0.167  0.231  0.286 
3  0.286  0.375  0.444 
4  0.375  0.474  0.545 
Source  Author's calculations as described in text. 
The question is what impact this expansion has on the current account, 
which in this framework amounts to asking what happens to consump- 
tion of the traded good. 
One can take a shortcut here,  if one imagines  that the expansion  is 
"brief,"  in  the  sense  that one  can  ignore  the  effect  of  the  current 
account on the future investment income of the country. Removing  this 
assumption  would  only  reinforce  the  results.  In the  case  of  a brief 
expansion,  it is possible to calculate analytically a "beggar thy neighbor 
coefficient,"  defined as the ratio of the increase in the expanding coun- 
try's  current  account  surplus  (measured  as  a  share  of  GDP)  to  the 
percentage  increase in its GDP.  Appendix  B shows  that 
I  -  p 
(12)  1~~~~~  -  p  -  (I/T) 
where p is relative risk aversion and T is the traded share of consumption 
(and hence value added in the economy).  One sees immediately  that in 
the special  case of p equal to 1, a monetary expansion  has no effect  on 
the expanding  country's  current account,  which  is  roughly  what the 
econometric  exercises  in table  1 indicate.  If relative  risk aversion  is 
higher  than  1,  there  will  to  some  extent  be  expansion  by  means  of 
inflation, as a result of a widened current account surplus, but the extent 
will  depend inversely  on how open the economy  is,  as measured by 7. 
Table 2 shows beggar thy neighbor coefficients  for a range of values of 
p and 7.  If one believes  the folk  wisdom  that relative  risk aversion  is 
something  like  2,  and judgmentally  assumes  that the tradable share in 
the Japanese economy  is  not much more than 0.2,  the implication  is 
that an inflationary policy  that raised Japanese output by as much as 5 
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Table  3.  Depreciation  Coefficients 
7 
p  0.2  0.3  0.4 
2  1.67  1.54  1.43 
3  2.14  1.88  1.67 
4  2.5  2.11  1.82 
Source: Author's calculations as described in text. 
account surplus of something  like  1 percent of GDP.  This is far short 
of the huge surpluses envisaged  by Smithers and others. 19 
One  can  also  calculate  the real depreciation-as  measured by  the 
change  in a domestic  price index with weights  T and 1  -  Trelative  to 
the price of traded goods-associated  with a 1 percent increase in real 
GDP achieved  through inflationary expectations.  It can be shown that 
this depreciation  is 
1-v  i-p 
(13)  1+ 
1 -  -T 
Table 3 shows  depreciation  coefficients  for a range of values  of p and 
T.  These numbers look generally  small,  compared with the model sim- 
ulations in table 1. I discuss  why this might be so in the second part of 
the paper. 
Summary 
I  have  offered  a  quick  tour of  a rather extensive  and unfamiliar 
territory,  the  land  of  the  liquidity  trap.  Perhaps the  most  important 
lesson  to be learned from this tour is the strangeness  of the territory: 
once an economy  really is in a liquidity trap, much of the conventional 
wisdom of macroeconomics  ceases to apply-indeed,  applying conven- 
tional models  to the liquidity  trap universe  implies  some quite uncon- 
ventional  conclusions.  Aside  from  the  observation  that international 
capital mobility  makes less  difference  than most economists  probably 
suppose (an observation  that actually applies to open economy  macro- 
economics  in general),  I would highlight two conclusions  in particular. 
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First, one must be careful about making inferences from divergences 
between  the growth of  monetary base  and of  broad monetary  aggre- 
gates.  The failure of  aggregates  to grow need not indicate  dereliction 
on the part of the central bank; in a liquidity trap economy  the central 
bank in principle cannot move  broad monetary aggregates.  Likewise, 
the observation that although the central bank has slashed interest rates 
and pumped  up  monetary  base,  the  broader money  supply  has  not 
grown,  does  not  necessarily  imply  that the  fault  lies  in the  banking 
system;  it is just what one would expect  in a liquidity trap economy. 
Second,  whatever  the  specifics  of  the  situation,  a liquidity  trap is 
always  the product of  a credibility  problem: the public  believes  that 
current monetary expansion will not be sustained. Structural factors can 
explain why an economy  needs expected inflation; they can never imply 
that credibly sustained  monetary expansion  is ineffective. 
Japan's Trap 
Table 4 presents some  standard summary statistics  on Japan's eco- 
nomic performance since  1981.  It makes the familiar point that follow- 
ing rapid growth to  1991,  the economy  has gone through an extended 
period of very slow  growth.  The breakpoint shown  in the table,  how- 
ever,  is actually  1992 rather than 1991. The reason is that the Japanese 
economy  appeared to be overheated  in  1991,  so that part of the slow- 
down  in growth as measured from that date can be simply  viewed  as 
the  correction  of  an unsustainable  boom.  Inflationary pressures  had 
clearly  eased by  1992,  though,  and the low  growth rate thereafter is a 
better indicator of  the economy's  true shortfall.  It is clear that Japan 
will have a significant decline  in real GDP for 1998; and the unemploy- 
ment rate has already risen above 4 percent. 
There are two striking features of these dreary numbers. The first is 
the extent  of  the slowdown.  In the period  1981-92  Japan grew  at an 
average rate of  3.7  percent.  It ended the period with the same unem- 
ployment  rate as it had started with,  and with a lower inflation rate; in 
short,  potential  as well  as actual output would  seem  to have risen  at 
about 3.7  percent annually over the period.  If one had projected that 
growth  rate forward,  one  would  have  overpredicted  1998  output by 
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Table  4.  Economic  Performance  in Japan, 1981-97 
Percent 
Real GDP  Unemployment  Money market 
Year  growth  Inflation  rate  interest rate 
1981  3.2  4.1  2.2  ... 
1982  3.1  1.8  2.4  ... 
1983  2.3  1.8  2.7  ... 
1984  3.9  2.6  2.7  6.5 
1985  4.4  2.1  2.6  6.6 
1986  2.9  1.8  2.8  5.1 
1987  4.2  0.1  2.8  4.2 
1988  6.2  0.7  2.5  4.5 
1989  4.8  2.0  2.3  5.4 
1990  5.1  2.3  2.1  7.7 
1991  3.8  2.7  2.1  7.2 
1992  1.0  1.7  2.2  4.3 
1981-92  average  3.7  2.0  2.5  5.7 
1993  0.3  0.6  2.5  2.9 
1994  0.6  0.2  2.9  2.3 
1995  1.5  -0.6  3.1  1.2 
1996  3.9  -0.5  3.4  0.6 
1997  0.9  0.6  3.4  0.6 
1993-97  average  1.4  0.1  2.4  1.5 
Source: Initerniationial  Financial Statistics,  1998. 
The second feature is the low interest rates of recent years; Japanese 
money  market rates have been below  1 percent since  1995.  It is true 
that Japan has not pushed money  market rates down to their absolute 
minimum-at  the time of writing, there are still 43 basis points to go- 
but the economy  is clearly  in a very good  approximation to liquidity 
trap conditions. 
How  important a role  does  this  liquidity  trap play  in  the  growth 
slowdown  and current slump? In principle,  the great bulk of the slow- 
down might represent a reduction in the rate of potential output growth; 
in that case,  even  a successful  stimulative  policy  would  have  only  a 
small payoff,  so that freeing the economy  from its liquidity trap is not 
a particularly urgent issue.  It is therefore important to estimate the gap 
between actual and potential output. 
For the United  States,  the output gap is usually  estimated  by com- 
bining an estimate of the natural rate of unemployment with an estimate 
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Figure  4. Okun's Law for Japan, 1982-91 
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in real GDP.  Although  Japan's measured unemployment  rate has tra- 
ditionally  moved  much  less  than that of  the  United  States,  there  is 
actually  a surprisingly close  Okun's  Law relationship  in the  1982-91 
period,  as shown  in figure 4.  The slope of the apparent relationship  is 
about three times  as steep  as for the United  States: it apparently took 
about 6 percentage points of excess  growth to reduce the unemployment 
rate by  1 percentage point.  If one were to take the average 2.5  percent 
unemployment  rate in the period before the slump as an estimate of the 
natural rate, the 3.4 percent unemployment rate in 1997 would therefore 
seem to imply  an output gap of more than 5 percent in that year-and 
with potential output presumably still growing while output slumps, by 
the end of  1998 the gap could be as great as 10 percent. 
Most published estimates of Japan's output gap are far smaller. Many 
of  these  estimates,  notably those of the International Monetary Fund, 
are based on the Hodrick-Prescott  filter, which  minimizes  a weighted 
sum of squared deviations  of actual from potential output and squared Paul R. Krugman  169 
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changes  in the  growth  rate of  potential  output.20 The  main  practical 
advantage of  this  method  is  that it can be  used  even  when  there are 
secular changes  in both potential  growth rates and the natural rate of 
unemployment.  However,  Hodrick-Prescott  has severe  disadvantages 
when applied to an economy  that undergoes  a sustained slump.  First, 
it imposes  the assumption  that average  deviations  from potential  are 
zero over the whole period, so that when the economy  slumps, the filter 
automatically  reevaluates  earlier periods  as times  of  above-potential 
output, reducing the estimated shortfall.  Second,  any sustained drop in 
output gets built into the estimated potential growth rate. As a result, 
it systematically  understates the actual shortfall from potential. A stark, 
if  somewhat  unfair,  way  to make this point  is to  apply the Hodrick- 
Prescott filter to the United  States in the interwar period,  as shown  in 
figure 5.  For this figure,  the smoothing  parameter X is set at 25; but a 
20.  See Giorno  and others (1995) for a description. 170  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1998 
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wide range of values of X  yields the conclusion  that output was in excess 
of potential by  1935. 
The  Organisation  for  Economic  Co-operation  and  Development 
(OECD) has adopted a more complex technique to assess Japan's output 
gap; its most recent estimates are shown in figure 6.21  Nonetheless,  the 
estimated output gap in 1997 is remarkably small:  -  1.2 percent. This 
seems to be due to the fact that although the OECD does not engage  in 
simple Hodrick-Prescott filtering, it updates estimates of normal worker 
hours  and worker  productivity  in  such  a way  that possibly  cyclical 
components  get reinterpreted as structural trends. Figure 7 provides  a 
nice illustration of this process at work, by contrasting the estimates of 
potential growth in the 1995 study by Giorno and others that introduced 
the OECD's  current method  with  the potential  growth estimates  that 
appear in the  most  recent  OECD  Economic  Outlook.  As  recently  as 
21.  The OECD  methodology  is described  in Giorno  and others  (1995). Paul R. Krugman  171 
Figure 7. OECD Estimates  of Japanese  Potential  Growth, 1987-97 
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three  years  ago,  the  OECD  estimated  Japan's  potential  growth  at 
3 percent; now  it  has  marked it  down  to  1.6  percent.  Applying  the 
earlier 3 percent potential  growth to the period  since  1994,  the  1997 
output shortfall rises  to 4.6  percent; not too  far short of  the estimate 
suggested  by the Okun's Law calculation  for Japan. 
If the Japanese output gap was  3 to 4 percent in  1997,  if potential 
output growth is 2 to 3 percent,  and if,  as now  seems  certain,  output 
falls  throughout  1998,  the  output gap  at the  end  of  1998  will  quite 
probably  exceed  7  percent.  Obviously  there  is  no  precision  in  this 
estimate; my guess  is that in retrospect it will  seem clear that Japan's 
1998 output gap was 8 percent or more. But one can make a very strong 
case that it will exceed  5 percent,  so that demand-side policies  to close 
that gap are of very real importance. 
Saving and Investment 
A liquidity trap occurs when desired saving exceeds  desired invest- 
ment at full  employment,  even  at a zero  short-term interest rate.  As 172  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1998 
Table  5.  Private Consumption  as a Share of GDP,  Japan and the United States, 
1991-97 
Percent 
Year  Japan  United States 
1991  57.1  67.1 
1992  57.8  67.6 
1993  58.6  68.0 
1994  59.7  67.8 
1995  60.1  68.2 
1996  59.9  68.2 
1997  60.6  67.9 
Source: Initerniationial  Finianicial  Statistics,  1998. 
argued in  the  first part of  this  paper,  for  some  purposes  it does  not 
matter why this is the case,  as long  as it is.  Still,  the intepretation of 
Japan's problem, and to some extent the policy implications,  do depend 
on how one views  the apparent excess  saving. 
Table 5 shows ratios of consumption to GDP for Japan and the United 
States  since  1991.  Two  familiar  observations  stand out.  One  is  that 
Japan's consumption  ratio remains  very  low  by comparison  with  the 
United States.  A vast literature has attempted to explain this disparity; 
this paper has nothing to add to it. The other observation is that Japan's 
consumption ratio has not declined in the 1990s; if anything, it has risen 
slightly.  This  suggests  that the shift into liquidity  trap territory might 
reflect declining  investment  demand rather than rising saving  supply. 
How  significant  is the difference  between  U.S.  and Japanese con- 
sumption ratios? Consider the 1997 difference  of approximately 7 per- 
centage  points  of GDP.  If U.S.  consumers  were suddenly  to start be- 
having like their Japanese counterparts, this would be the equivalent of 
a 7 percent of GDP negative  fiscal impulse.  Suppose  that the Fed then 
tried to offset  that contraction  with looser  monetary policy.  Would  it 
be able to do so, or would the U.S.  find itself in liquidity trap territory? 
Recall that the emergence  of budget deficits of approximately 3 percent 
of  GDP  in the  1980s  was  widely  held  to have  raised real short-term 
interest rates by 3 or 4 percentage points; the difference  between  Jap- 
anese and U.S.  consumption shares is more than twice as large a shock. 
Another approach is to ask what the impact of  such a monetary-fiscal 
switch  would be in a variety of standard econometric  models,  such as 
those considered  in table  1. Table 6 reports estimates  of the impact of Paul R. Krugman  173 
Table  6.  Effect on U.S. Short-Term  Interest Rates of a Fiscal-Monetary  Switch 
Equivalent  to a 1 Percent  Decline in the Consumption  Ratio 
Percent 
Modela 
DRI  -4.3 
EEC  -4.4 
EPA  -5.3 
LINK  -1.9 
LIVERPOOL  -2.2 
MCM  -4.3 
MINIMOD  -2.9 
MSG  -  3.3 
OECD  -2.3 
TAYLOR  -0.7 
VAR  -0.4 
WHARTON  -5.3 
Summary statistic 
Median  -3.1 
Source  Frankel (1988,  pp. 21, 23) 
a  Models are those used in table I 
a monetary-fiscal  switch  equivalent  to a 1 percent decline  in the con- 
sumption ratio; both the mean and the median effects  are a 3 percentage 
point decline  in the short-term interest rate. 
It is easy to find reasons why such exercises  might overstate the case; 
structural models  probably tend to understate the spending impact of a 
sustained reduction in the interest rate. But even this crude comparison 
makes it substantially less surprising than one might have supposed that 
Japan, with its low consumption,  has indeed found itself  in a liquidity 
trap. In fact, this exercise  suggests that the real puzzle is not why Japan 
is now in a liquidity  trap, but why the trap did not materialize  sooner. 
How was Japan able to invest  so much,  at relatively  high real interest 
rates, before the  1990s?  The most obvious  answer is some  version  of 
the accelerator: investment  demand was  high because  of Japan's sus- 
tained high growth rate,  and therefore ultimately  because  of the high 
rate of potential output growth.  In that case,  the slump in investment 
demand in the  1990s  may be explained  in part by a slowdown  in the 
underlying sources of Japanese potential growth, and especially  in pro- 
spective  potential growth. 
As noted above,  there is considerable  uncertainty about the actual 
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that there has been  a slowdown  in the rate of  increase  in total factor 
productivity,  even  cyclically  adjusted.  It is certain,  however,  that Ja- 
pan's long-run growth must slow,  even at full employment,  because of 
demographics.  Through the  1980s,  Japanese employment  expanded at 
1.2 percent annually.22 However,  the working-age  population has now 
peaked: it will decline at 0.7  percent annually over the next thirty years, 
and-if  demographers' projections about fertility are correct-at  a re- 
markable 1.0 percent for the twenty-five years thereafter.23  As suggested 
by the discussion of investment and Tobin's q in the first part of this paper, 
such prospective demographic decline should, other things equal, depress 
expectations of future q, and hence also depress current investment. 
The looming  shortage of working-age  Japanese people has been vis- 
ible  for a long  time; indeed,  the budgetary consequences  of  an aging 
population  have been  a preoccupation  of the Ministry of Finance  and 
an important factor inhibiting  expansionary  fiscal  policy.  One reason 
why this prospect did not start to affect long-term investment  projects 
earlier  is  the  "bubble  economy"  of  the  late  1980s.  Businesses  may 
have believed  that total factor productivity would grow rapidly enough 
to make up for a declining  work force.  However,  the bubble economy 
may also have masked the underlying decline  in investment  opportun- 
ities,  and hence  delayed  the day of reckoning.  Moreover,  that bubble 
economy  left a legacy  of large debts and troubled bank balance sheets, 
which are widely regarded as the main culprits of Japan's current plight. 
Banking Problems 
Japan clearly  faces  a huge  problem of  bad bank loans;  the current 
conventional  wisdom  places their value at a trillion dollars.  These bad 
loans are in part a legacy  of the burst of the asset bubble of the 1980s, 
reinforced by the consequences  of the subsequent slow growth. Clearly 
Japan will  need to engage  in a cleanup operation dwarfing that of the 
U.S.  thrift crisis,  especially  as measured against Japan's smaller econ- 
omy.  Inevitably,  also,  the form and funding  of  that cleanup  will  be 
central political  preoccupations.  But how  central are the problems  of 
banks to the country's  macroeconomic  difficulties? 
This may seem an odd question to ask. Disruption of financial inter- 
22.  OECD Economic  Outlook,  December  1997,  p. A23. 
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Table  7. Japanese  Financial Data, 1994-97 
Index, 1994 =  100 
M2  plus 
Year  Monetary  base  certificates  of deposit  Bank  credit 
1994  100.0  100.0  100.0 
1995  107.8  103.3  100.8 
1996  117.0  106.5  100.6 
1997  125.6  110.6  100.9 
Source: Itntertnatiotnal  Fitnanicial  Statistics,  1998 
mediation has clearly played a crucial role in many if not most historical 
financial crises,  including the current crisis in the emerging economies 
of  Asia.  Also,  to  many  economists  it  seems  a priori obvious  that if 
conventional  monetary policy  has become  ineffective,  the reason must 
be that the troubles  of  the banks have  blocked  the usual channels  of 
central bank influence. 
A  casual  look  at the  data does  seem  to  support the view  that the 
Japanese problem with monetary policy lies in the banks. Table 7 shows 
developments  in high-powered  money,  broad money,  and bank credit 
since the end of 1994. It is evident that a fairly rapid growth in monetary 
base  has  failed  to  produce  an equivalent  growth  in  broad monetary 
aggregates,  and has actually been  accompanied  by stagnation in bank 
credit. However,  recall the discussion  of financial intermediation under 
liquidity trap conditions  in the first part of this paper: given an economy 
in  a  liquidity  trap,  this  sort  of  disconnect  between  monetary  base, 
aggregates,  and bank credit  is  to  be  expected  even  if  the  banks  are 
financially  healthy.  It is  not evidence  that the banks'  troubles  aggra- 
vated the problem. 
It is important to realize that Japan has not (yet?) suffered from any 
widespread run by depositors-in  this sense,  Japanese banks are like 
the U.S.  thrifts,  whose  financial  woes  were  widely  recognized  well 
before the cleanup began, but whose depositors remained calm because 
of  an underlying  government  guarantee.  As  a result,  Japanese banks 
have not been forced  into the kinds of  fire-sale  liquidations  of  loans, 
abrupt  removal of credit lines,  and so forth, that produce a classic  bank- 
centered financial crisis: the kind of crisis that has afflicted its emerging- 
economy  neighbors. 
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of questionable  solvency  to behave? Would it restrict credit? The text- 
book answer is just the opposite:  as long as an insolvent  or near insol- 
vent bank is able to hold on to deposits thanks to government guarantee, 
it has an incentive  to overlend  to risky projects.24 In effect,  the game 
is "heads I win, tails the taxpayer loses."  Indeed, one could argue that 
since the bubble burst, Japan's financial institutions have actually been 
in the situation of  U.S.  thrifts before  the crackdown,  with the moral 
hazard of their position creating a bias toward too much rather than too 
little lending. 
This is not merely abstract speculation.  Japan has already, in regard 
to the jusen  (nonbank subsidiaries of financial institutions,  specializing 
in housing loans),  gone through a miniature version of the systemwide 
bank cleanup that it must now undertake. According to Thomas Cargill, 
Michael  Hutchinson,  and Takatoshi  Ito, jusen  lending  actually  grew 
rapidly in 1990-91,  even as asset deflation was underway,  "as a result 
of  funds  provided  by  agricultural cooperatives  and their prefectural 
associations."25  Because  these agricultural cooperatives  had strong po- 
litical  influence,  they were  able to take large risks while  counting  on 
implicit government guarantees. The result was behavior strongly rem- 
iniscent of that of the U.S.  thrifts. Indeed, Cargill, Hutchinson,  and Ito 
offer a striking example  of lending driven by moral hazard in the case 
of two credit cooperatives  that failed  in November  1994.  The relevant 
authorities apparently knew that these cooperatives  were insolvent more 
than a year before their actual closure; presumably the management knew 
considerably earlier. Nonetheless,  in the two years before the institutions 
were closed,  both their deposits and their loans expanded rapidly. 
How can the logic  of excessive  lending by banks be reconciled with 
tales of credit crunch? The immediate answer is that such tales are a very 
recent phenomenon. An informal search of news archives finds few alle- 
gations of credit rationing in Japan before the second half of  1997; even 
well into the fall of that year, a number of observers questioned whether 
there was really any credit crunch, or at least,  whether it was  serious. 
Only by early 1998 did the credit squeeze become widely accepted. 
24.  This  line  of  argument now  plays  a major role in discussions  of  the troubles  in 
the  emerging  economies  of  Asia;  see  McKinnon  and  Pill  (1997);  Krugman  (1998); 
Corsetti,  Pesenti,  and Roubini (1998). 
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A review  of press reports also makes the reasons for the emergence 
of  credit  constraints  in late  1997  quite clear.  The immediate  forcing 
event was the announcement, in October 1997, of new capital adequacy 
standards, to be effective  from April 1998. To meet this standard, banks 
began  cutting  back on  loans  that would  have  required larger capital 
backing.  In other words,  the financial problems of the banks only be- 
came  a drag on aggregate  demand when  the government  began  half- 
hearted efforts to come to grips with those problems. 
More generally,  one can argue that since late 1997, the prospect that 
the  government  would  eventually  seize  some  but not  all  banks  has 
created a new incentive for banks near the edge to dress up their balance 
sheets,  in order to make the cut. The payoff  to those successful  in this 
endeavor  is,  loosely  speaking,  that they  will  live  to make bad loans 
again; or to say it somewhat  differently,  they want to stay out of gov- 
ernment hands at least for a while,  in order to capture the value of the 
put option implied by government deposit  guarantees. 
This should all sound familiar to economists  in the United States.  A 
mild form of the same ailment appeared in 1990-92,  when the size  of 
the savings  and loans bailout had become  apparent, and it was widely 
said that commercial banks might be next.  As in the Japanese case,  the 
credit crunch appeared not during the years when banks were  getting 
into financial trouble, but when it began to look likely that the govern- 
ment would do something  about the situation. 
But if the threat of bank closures or seizures is causing a credit crunch 
that has deepened  Japan's slump,  why  engage  in bank reform at all? 
The answer is that cleaning  up bad banks is a microeconomic  policy, 
undertaken to remove the distortion in the direction of investment  that 
results from moral hazard-and  also  to limit  the eventual  liability  of 
the government,  since  (as  both the U.S.  savings  and loans  case  and 
Japanese experience  with  credit  cooperatives  so  graphically  demon- 
strate) delay only multiplies  the losses.  That it might reduce aggregate 
demand as a side effect  is of little relevance.  Under normal circumstan- 
ces,  the macroeconomic  effects  of this or any other move  toward mi- 
croeconomic efficiency  that happens to discourage spending can simply 
be offset with a looser monetary policy.  Japan's problem is that because 
it is in a liquidity trap, the normal disconnect  between  microeconomic 
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Policy  Options and Their Consequences 
Given all that I have said, it is useful to review Japan's policy options 
and ask how well they would work. Current discussion  focuses  on three 
basic alternatives,  which are not mutually exclusive. 
FISCAL EXPANSION. This is the classic  remedy for a liquidity trap and 
has been pursued by Japan in a sort of stop-go  fashion for much of the 
period since  1992.  At the time of writing,  the traditional emphasis  on 
public works seems  to have given  way to a new emphasis  on "perma- 
nent"  tax cuts. 
There are two  major questions  about fiscal  expansion  as a remedy 
for Japan, one strictly economic,  one political.  The economic  issue  is 
whether  an adequate expansion  is possible  without creating  an unac- 
ceptable  impact on the government's  long-term  fiscal position.  Much 
discussion  of fiscal  stimulus in Japan seems  to be predicated on some 
form of  pump-priming  (or jump-starting):  the idea that a brief period 
of  stimulus  will  jolt  the economy  back into  a favorable  equilibrium. 
However,  there is no good evidence  for such a multiple-equilibria  view; 
indeed,  Romer has argued that even  the historical  episode  usually  in- 
voked in support of that view,  the U . S. recovery from the Great Depres- 
sion,  has been misinterpreted.26 An alternative view  is that Japan has a 
long-term  deficiency  of  demand due to  low  rates of  time  preference 
combined  with negative  population growth-and  also an output gap of 
7 percent or more-so  that the size and duration of the deficits implied 
would  be  very  large.27 If  one  expects  interest rates to  stay  near zero 
indefinitely, the level of government debt hardly matters. But if one ex- 
pects  that at a sufficiently  distant date real rates will  become  strongly 
positive  again,  the eventual  size  of  that debt becomes  an important 
concern. 
The political  point is that Japan-like  the United  States during the 
New  Deal-appears  to  have  great difficulty  in  working  up political 
nerve for a fiscal package  anywhere close  to that required to close  the 
output gap. Exactly why this is so is an interesting question,  but beyond 
this paper's scope. 
26.  Romer  (1992). 
27.  A useful indication  of the seriousness  of the situation  in Japan  is that ten-year 
government  bond rates are now less than 0.7 percent, suggesting  that investors  expect 
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This  surely  does  not,  however,  mean  that fiscal  policy  should  be 
ignored as part of the policy  mix.  On the general Brainard principle- 
when uncertain about the right model,  throw a bit of everything  at the 
problem-one  would want to apply fiscal stimulus.  (Not even I would 
trust myself  enough to go for a purely Krugman solution.)  But it seems 
unlikely  that a mainly fiscal solution  will  be enough. 
BANKING REFORM. Japan clearly  needs  to clean  up its financial sys- 
tem.  Many commentators  seem  to believe  that this  urgent microeco- 
nomic  step will  also make a major contribution to solving  the macro- 
economic  problem.  However,  as shown above,  the financial problems 
of the banks have until recently biased them toward lending too much 
rather than too little. 
Ironically,  indications that the Japanese government is finally getting 
its  nerve  up to  do  something  about the  banks have  probably  been  a 
significant  factor  in the  economy's  slide  over  the  past year.  From a 
macroeconomic  as  opposed  to  microeconomic  view,  a situation  in 
which the government is expected  to start seizing  banks but has not yet 
done so is the worst of all possible  worlds.  The most important thing 
is to get  on with the job  and get  it over  with.  If Japanese authorities 
behave  true to form and carry out bank seizures  and closures  slowly, 
initially  adopting excessively  lenient criteria and only  gradually tight- 
ening them, credit constraints could be a depressing factor on the econ- 
omy for years to come. 
Moreover,  a radical, forceful bank cleanup-which  basically  settles 
the issue and leaves  the remaining banks reasonably sure that they will 
not be  taken over-would  in  principle  leave  the banking  system  no 
more willing  to lend,  and in fact somewhat  less  so,  than it was a year 
ago.  The reason  is  that until  the  second  half  of  1997,  at least  some 
banks were  driven  by  moral  hazard to  take  excessive  risks  in  their 
lending; once  the system  has been cleaned  up,  that extra boost  to ag- 
gregate demand will  be gone. 
In short, a financial cleanup is vital on microeconomic  grounds; and 
given that it must be done,  on macroeconomic  grounds it is best done 
quickly.  But it is unlikely  to bootstrap Japan out of its liquidity trap. 
MANAGED INFLATION.  Thanks to  the  Internet (Nouriel  Roubini  has 
become the Matt Drudge of the Asian crisis),  proposals that Japan adopt 
an inflation target as an answer to its  liquidity  trap have become  the 
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logic  of  such an approach is laid out in the first part of this paper. In 
Japan's case,  there would  be three main issues:  implementation,  the 
appropriate target, and the likely  effects. 
How can a country in a liquidity  trap-that  is,  where increases  in 
the money supply seem to have no effect-engineer  inflation? As I have 
shown,  the problem is essentially  one of credibility.  If the central bank 
can credibly  commit  to pursue inflation where possible,  and ratify in- 
flation when it comes,  it should be able to increase inflationary expec- 
tations  despite  the absence  of  any direct traction on the economy  by 
means of current monetary policy.  Indeed, if one views monetary policy 
in terms of  nominal  interest rates,  a credible  commitment  to inflation 
can seem  to be a pure bootstrap policy:  interest rates need never fall; 
all that is required is  a promise  not to raise them when the economy 
expands and prices begin to rise. 
How  in fact to create these  expectations  is,  in a sense,  outside  the 
usual  boundaries  of  economics.  However,  one  obvious  suggestion  is 
that Japan deal with its inverted credibility problem through legislation 
giving the Bank of Japan an inverted version of the price stability targets 
now in force in a number of countries: it would be enjoined to achieve 
an inflation rate of not less than x percent over y years.  (If this does not 
work, appendix C discusses  several ways in which the necessary  infla- 
tion expectations  might nonetheless  be generated.) 
And this raises the question of the appropriate inflation target. A key 
insight  is  that the objective  of  the  inflation  target is  not particularly 
exotic:  it is simply  to reduce the real interest rate sufficiently  to bring 
the economy  back to potential  output.  Although  this real interest re- 
duction  must be  achieved  via  inflation,  because  the nominal  interest 
rate is up against the zero constraint, in other respects it should act just 
like a conventional  monetary expansion.  So one can estimate  the size 
of the necessary inflation simply by asking how large a real interest rate 
reduction would normally be needed to eliminate an output gap as large 
as Japan's. 
One might also note that while the theoretical models of the first part 
of this paper were cast in terms of a one-period  liquidity  trap, econo- 
mists have no real idea of how long  a "period"  is.  However,  Japan's 
liquidity  trap looks  like  a fairly  long-term  problem; also,  investment 
and exchange  rates are generally  believed  to be  driven by  long-term 
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Table 8.  Reduction  in U.S.  Long-Term  Interest  Rates That Would Expand  Real GNP 
by 1 Percent 
Percent 
Modela 
DRI  -0.82 
EEC  -1.80 
LINK  -0.64 
MCM  -0.68 
MINIMOD  -0.30 
OECD  -0.94 
TAYLOR  -0.30 
WHARTON  -2.70 
Summary statistic 
Median  -0.75 
Source: Bryant and others (1988). 
a. Models are those used in table 1. 
at least a decade-of  inflation,  to reduce the real long-term rate suffi- 
ciently  to close  the output gap. 
At this point,  matters become  difficult.  The  size  of Japan's output 
gap is  highly  uncertain,  although  it is probably well  over  5 percent. 
Worse  yet,  there is no consensus  on the stimulative  effect  of  a given 
interest rate reduction.  As  in earlier discussions,  it may be useful  to 
look  not at the small number of estimates  for Japan, but at the larger 
range of estimates for that other large, relatively closed  advanced econ- 
omy,  the United  States.  Table  8 shows  estimates  of  the reduction  in 
long-term interest rates needed to expand real U.S.  GDP by  1 percent, 
using the various standard econometric  models  introduced in table  1. 
Given  the  uncertainties,  any  number is  a matter of  multiplicative 
guesswork.  I would  suggest  the following  series  of  leaps  of faith: al- 
though Japan's current output gap is probably well  over 5 percent,  the 
combination  of  fiscal  stimulus  and-if  all goes  well-clarification  of 
which banks will  be taken over and which will  not,  should reduce that 
gap by several percentage  points.  Therefore managed inflation would 
need to close a remaining gap of,  say, 4 to 5 percentage points.  Looking 
at the median estimate in table 8, this would require an inflation target 
of  3 to 3.75  percent.  So,  to give  a bit of extra room (one can always 
raise nominal interest rates if the economy  seems  to be overheating- 
as long as the inflation target is met),  how about 4 percent inflation for 
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This  target should  not really  be taken seriously.  Rather,  it should 
serve mainly to stimulate serious research.  And there is probably time 
for such research,  since it will  take some time before the idea of man- 
aged  inflation  overcomes  the  instinctive  negative  reactions  of  many 
policymakers. 
What side  consequences  might one  expect  from such a solution  to 
Japan's slump? In particular, what would happen to the current account 
and the value of the yen? Recall  that a policy  of managed inflation is, 
in  principle,  simply  a monetary  expansion  by  other means.  Typical 
estimates  suggest  that a monetary policy  that expands output by 1 per- 
cent leads to a depreciation  on the order of  5 percent.  So the implied 
yen  depreciation  from  such  a policy  would  be  on the order of  20  to 
25 percent-a  number that is probably less uncertain than the required 
inflation  rate  discussed  above,  although  still  more  of  a  stimulus  to 
debate than a serious estimate. 
Concluding Remarks 
Japan's economic  difficulties  are widely  viewed  as essentially  polit- 
ical: if only the politicians  would  bite the bullet,  they would get their 
country moving again. But in fact it has been far from clear what exactly 
Japan should  be doing-which  is to say that the problems  are not so 
much political  as conceptual. 
In this paper I have argued that to understand Japan's problems one 
needs to revive and modernize the theory of the liquidity trap, a concept 
that once  played  a major role  in macroeconomics,  but has  virtually 
disappeared from economic  discourse  in the past twenty years. Taking 
liquidity  traps seriously  does  not,  it turns out,  require a rethinking of 
the fundamentals  of  macroeconomics;  liquidity  traps can quite easily 
be  generated  in basically  conventional  models  that meet  the modern 
criteria of  rational behavior  and intertemporal consistency.  It is even 
possible  to have full-employment,  flexible  price analyses of the liquid- 
ity  trap.  However,  applying  conventional  modeling  to  liquidity  trap 
conditions produces unconventional conclusions  and policy recommen- 
dations.  My claim  is that strange as they may seem,  these conclusions 
are the best guide available  for dealing with Japan's malaise. 
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a  liquidity  trap could  happen  in  Japan; now  that it has,  one  should 
wonder whether it could happen elsewhere.  Germany and France cur- 
rently  have  short-term interest rates of  only  3.5  percent,  and Europe 
faces Japanese-style  demographics; could a liquidity trap happen to the 
European Monetary Union?  Economists  now  know  that the  liquidity 
trap is not a historical myth: it can and does really happen sometimes, 
and we had better try to understand it. 
APPENDIX  A 
Financial Intermediation  and Monetary  Aggregates in 
a Liquidity  Trap 
IN THE TEXT, I sketch out how one might think about the role of financial 
intermediaries  and the behavior of  monetary aggregates  in a liquidity 
trap. This  appendix describes  that "cash  in advance meets  Diamond- 
Dybvig"  approach more fully. 
Consider,  for  simplicity,  a full-employment  endowment  economy 
that lasts for only two periods, with each individual receiving an endow- 
ment y1 in period one,  Y2 in period two.  In the aggregate there is  no 
uncertainty; however, each individual is uncertain ex ante about when he 
will want to consume. The assumed utility function takes the form 
(14)  U  =  HUI(cl)  +  (1  -H)U2(C2), 
where H takes on the value  1 with probability  ar, value 0 with proba- 
bility  1  -  ar. So  in the population  there will  be  fractions  ar of  first 
period consumers,  1 -  ar  of second period consumers. 
One wants to make this a cash in advance economy.  But finite hor- 
izons pose problems for a fiat-money economy,  while trying to have an 
infinite  horizon  would  complicate  the  simple  Diamond-Dybvig-type 
logic  considerably.  As  a device  for sidestepping  these  problems,  as- 
sume that each individual is issued with a quantity of money M* at the 
beginning,  which  must  be  repaid  at the  end.  The  government  may, 
however,  inject  additional  money  into the economy  via  open  market 
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Within each period, consumers must pay in cash before they receive 
income  from selling  their own endowments.  As  in the basic  model  in 
the text,  they are able to trade cash for bonds at the beginning  of the 
first period (including  bonds issued or purchased by the government in 
open market operations).  However,  in order to motivate financial inter- 
mediaries,  assume  that a consumer  does  not know his own type until 
after the capital market; so he can no longer simply acquire just enough 
cash for planned purchases within the period. 
This  is  where  financial  intermediaries  come  in.  Assume  that there 
exist banks which accept deposits during the initial capital market, then 
allow  customers  to withdraw their deposits  if they turn out to have H 
equal to 1. (Bank runs are left on one side for this paper!) Deposits  earn 
competitive  interest if not withdrawn. 
Thus the sequence  of events  looks  like this: 
-Consumers  come into existence  and receive the money supply M*. 
-A  capital market is held; consumers deposit money in banks, and 
open market operations may increase or decrease the monetary base. 
-Consumers  learn their type. 
-They  withdraw their funds if necessary. 
-Consumers  receive  income from sale of their endowment,  receive 
bonds  and  deposits,  and pay  or receive  whatever  tax  or transfer is 
needed. 
-Consumers  purchase second period consumption. 
-They  receive  income  from sales  of  endowment,  and repay their 
money  to the government. 
In this setting,  the real interest rate is determined independent of the 
money  supply.  Each individual  gets  to spend the present value  of his 
endowment  in the appropriate period. Thus a period one consumer will 
get to purchase units of the good  in period one; but since  a fraction  ar 
of consumers  is type one, 
(15)  rr[y1 +  y21(l  +  r)]  Yl, 
implying  that the real interest rate is 
(16)  1+r=  1  Y2 
I  -  aTry, 
Assume,  provisionally,  that the nominal interest rate is positive.  Then 
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will  borrow, establishing  bank accounts equal to Pc,  the amount they 
will spend if they are type one; they will hold no cash. Banks, however, 
need hold only  a fraction  ar  of their deposits  in reserves  and will  hold 
no more than necessary; they lend the rest out (which is how consumers 
get  the money  for the deposits).  So  bank deposits  will  be a multiple 
1/'rr  of the monetary base; the velocity  of base will be 1, that of deposits 
,F. And from here on, the model will work in pretty much the same way 
as the pure outside money model in the text. 
But what happens if the government  increases M relative  to M* to 
such an extent that the nominal interest rate goes  to zero-which  can 
clearly  happen here, just  as in the simple  endowment  model  with  no 
uncertainty. First, consumers become  indifferent between holding cash 
and holding  deposits;  second,  they  become  indifferent  between  cash 
and bonds;  finally,  banks  also  become  indifferent  between  cash  and 
bonds.  At  this  point  any  further open  market bond  purchase  by  the 
government  could  be  absorbed  in any  combination  of  three  ways: 
(1)  consumers  could  create new  bonds  to  sell  to the government  and 
simply hold extra currency; (2) banks could  sell  bonds to the govern- 
ment and add the cash to their reserves; (3) consumers could sell bonds 
to the government instead of borrowing from banks. 
It is indeterminate which would happen, since none of these actions 
has any effect on either real variables or the price level.  Action  1 would 
lead to some increase in common definitions  of the money  supply; the 
others would  not.  Action  3 would  lead  to  an actual decline  in bank 
credit. So as stated in the text,  it is actually normal for increases in the 
monetary base to have little effect  on broader aggregates,  and even  to 
reduce bank credit, when the economy  is in a liquidity  trap. 
APPENDIX  B 
Current  Account  and Real Exchange Rate 
Consequences  of Monetary  Expansion 
IN  THE  TEXT,  I  introduce  a  simple  traded-nontraded good  model  to 
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movement.  In that model  a monetary expansion-current  money  in a 
positive  interest environment  or expected  future money  in a liquidity 
trap-can  raise output of  the nontraded good.  But what is the impact 
on  the  current account?  In this  model,  that question  reduces  to  the 
question of what happens to traded-good consumption. 
One can simplify  this  issue  by  starting with  an economy  in which 
trade is  balanced,  and normalizing  initial  prices  of  both  traded and 
nontraded goods  to one.  In that case,  one initially  has that 
cT  T 
(17)  C 
CN  1  T- 
One  can  further simplify  the  issue  by  supposing  that the  monetary 
expansion,  which leads to an increase in the production and consump- 
tion of nontraded goods,  is "brief,"  in the sense that it does not have 
a significant effect on the country's net investment income from abroad. 
In that case,  one knows  that the levels  of consumption  of both traded 
and nontraded goods in later periods will be unchanged,  and hence also 
that the marginal utility of each good in later periods will be unchanged. 
However,  the real interest rate on traded goods  is given  by the world 
capital market. Hence even in the current period the marginal utility of 
traded goods  will  remain unchanged,  as 
( 1  8)  au 
TCT(  P)  1c( 
T)(1  -p)  (18)  ~~~~aCT 
=  T  N 
Now  suppose  that there is a monetary expansion.  This will  lead to an 
increase  in  CN,  which  is  also  the increase  in GDP at initial  prices.  It 
may  also  lead to either a fall  or a rise in  CT,  which  corresponds  to  a 
move  toward current account  surplus or deficit.  The change  in  CT  as- 
sociated  with  a small rise in GDP can be evaluated  as follows.  First, 
note that 
(19)  T(T  -  P)  T  P  N 
AT 
and that 
(20)  au  T(  T)(1  P)CT( 
- P)  -  C(  1T)(  -  p)- 
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Finally, 
a2U 
(2 1  )  aCT  aCTaCN  (1  -T)(1  -P)  CT  i-p 
aCN  a2U  T(l-p)-l  CN  I 
aC2  7  AT  T 
which is the "beggar thy neighbor coefficient"  described in the text. 
APPENDIX  C 
Creating  Inflation  Expectations 
SUPPOSE THAT one believes  that Japan needs a negative real interest rate 
on a sustained basis, but also that a pure bootstrapping policy-in  which 
the announcement of  an inflation  target generates  the expansion  that 
eventually creates the inflation-is  infeasible.  Then Japan should apply 
some  temporary policy  that moves  the economy  to  a position  where 
monetary policy  does  have  traction and use  that traction to  generate 
sustained inflation. 
In this case, the temporary fiscal jolt comes into its own. The strategy 
would work along the following  lines:  a large fiscal  expansion  would 
be applied,  with interest rates kept at zero,  and sustained even  as the 
economy  began to develop  inflation.  Ideally,  the fiscal stimulus would 
then be phased out gradually, just slowly enough for rising expectations 
of inflation to take up the slack.  The important point is that monetary 
policy  would have to remain accommodating,  not only up to the point 
of full employment,  but as inflation rose to the necessary  level. 
What kind of fiscal policy  would be appropriate? One answer might 
be an explicitly  temporary investment tax credit, which would encour- 
age more or less  the same kind of spending as the immediate creation 
of inflation expectations. Comments 
and Discussion 
Kathryn  M.  Dominguez:  This paper analyzes  the efficacy  of various 
macroeconomic  stabilization  policies  for a recessionary  economy  with 
a nominal short-term interest rate close to zero. This economic  situation 
was  first discussed  by Keynes,  and subsequently  dubbed the liquidity 
trap,  in the context  of  the Great Depression.  Paul Krugman now  re- 
examines  the same issues  in a new context,  that of present day Japan. 
What makes the paper novel  and provocative  is that Krugman's policy 
prescription differs substantially from the Keynesian one-and,  for that 
matter, from any of those usually given by well-trained economists.  He 
recommends  that policymakers  facing  a liquidity  trap engage  in sus- 
tained monetary expansion,  that is,  "credibly  promise to be irrespon- 
sible,  to seek a higher future price level."  My comments  fall into two 
categories.  First,  I assess  Krugman's  (purposely)  provocative  policy 
advice; and second,  I examine some issues arising from the models that 
he presents. 
A liquidity  trap is defined as a situation in which,  because  nominal 
interest  rates  are at  or  near  zero,  investors  are indifferent  between 
holding  bonds  and money,  and as a consequence,  monetary policy  is 
ineffective  at boosting demand. Under normal circumstances,  monetary 
policy  will be neutral, or ineffective,  in the long run. But if one allows 
for some  price stickiness,  in the short run a monetary expansion  may 
increase  output  and will,  in  any  case,  lead  to  an equiproportionate 
increase in prices. However,  when interest rates are already "too low," 
so that the economy  is in a liquidity trap, monetary policy  is powerless 
to influence output or prices (in the IS-LM paradigm, the LM curve is 
188 Paul R. Krugman  189 
horizontal). It is for this reason that the traditional way out of a liquidity 
trap has been to rely on fiscal policy  (an IS shift). 
Krugman largely dismisses  fiscal policy  as a solution to the liquidity 
trap on the basis  of  a Ricardian equivalence  argument.  If the public 
understands that current government expenditures or tax cuts will even- 
tually need to be reversed,  it will  undo the government  actions-save 
rather than spend-in  anticipation  of the future fiscal policy  reversal. 
So, if the public is to some degree Ricardian, the argument goes,  fiscal 
policy  will  do little  to lift  an economy  out of  a liquidity  trap. (I have 
more to say on this below.)  Krugman then returns to monetary policy, 
which Keynes  and Hicks suggest  will  be ineffective,  and suggests  that 
if  central bankers can  credibly  commit  to  being  inflationary,  it may 
work after all. 
A key insight highlighted  in this paper is the role of expectations  in 
a liquidity trap world.  If one starts with the assumption that the public 
believes  that the central bank is committed  to price stability,  and if as 
a consequence  of expansionary monetary policy  prices rise above their 
current level,  the central bank will  be expected  to contract in order to 
stabilize prices.  Fundamentally  it is this belief,  that central banks are 
credible in the usual sense  of the word (that is,  they are committed  to 
price stability),  that renders monetary policy  ineffective.  A monetary 
expansion in this context  will  always be considered  temporary. And it 
is for this reason that Krugman suggests  that the central bank commit 
to letting prices rise in the future: if the public believes  that the central 
bank will not reverse an expansion,  the economy  can escape  from the 
trap by means of expansionary  monetary policy. 
Before discussing  some  of the subtleties  of Krugman's  arguments, 
it is worth asking  whether it is  possible  or wise  for central banks to 
commit to being irresponsible.  There exists  a vast literature examining 
the reverse proposition of whether a central bank can commit to being 
responsible. And my sense of this literature is that in theory the answer 
is yes,  and in practice the answer is often no. Game theory provides all 
kinds of "commitment mechanisms"  for central bankers; yet one rarely 
sees such mechanisms  put in place,  and even  more rarely enforced.  If 
central banks have had a hard time convincing  the public that they will 
be  responsible  and maintain  price  stability,  will  it  be  more  or  less 
difficult to convince  us that they will  steadfastly pursue an inflationary 
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just as any promise to hold to one policy  is unconvincing,  because  of 
time inconsistency. 
For the sake of  argument,  assume that a central bank in a liquidity 
trap goes  ahead  with  Krugman's  advice  and announces  a  sustained 
monetary expansion.  And assume that the public is convinced  that the 
central bank will  not reverse its program. What is the likely  outcome? 
In Krugman's scenario,  the expansion  will  steadily raise prices,  lower 
real interest rates, and depreciate the exchange  rate in an orderly fash- 
ion.  These  changes  will,  in turn, provide the public with incentives  to 
consume  and invest  more now,  and thereby jump start the economy. 
But there remain some  pitfalls.  If the public  is convinced  that the 
central bank will  not contract,  what is to stop people  from expecting 
accelerating  inflation? What if,  instead of moderate inflation,  expecta- 
tions  drive prices too high? Can a central bank commit to being  mod- 
erately irresponsible? And even if all goes well with moderate inflation, 
will  consumers  necessarily  spend more? If real interest rates turn neg- 
ative,  consumers will have an incentive  to invest abroad. This,  in turn, 
would  rob domestic  banks of deposits  and potentially  limit bank lend- 
ing. Higher inflation will also lead to higher long-term interest rates for 
corporate borrowers,  again dampening  the demand stimulus.  Finally, 
there are potential  repercussions  from a currency depreciation.  In the 
current postcrisis  environment  in  Asia,  it  is  difficult  to  predict  the 
impact of  a further depreciation  of the yen.  A fall  in the value of the 
yen might well  set off further declines  in the currencies of other Asian 
countries,  increasing  the burden of  their foreign  debts and leading  to 
even  greater economic  turmoil in the region. 
Although  attention is likely  to focus on Krugman's unorthodox pol- 
icy prescription,  the bulk of the paper is not about policy,  but rather, a 
reexamination  of the causes  and consequences  of liquidity  traps. In a 
series  of  simple  models,  Krugman considers  the roles  of  investment, 
capital mobility,  and financial intermediation in this context.  The pur- 
pose  of  these  models  is  to  show  that liquidity  traps can  be  created 
without  resorting  to  the  ad hoc  features  of  Hicks's  original  IS-LM 
analysis,  and that certain features of modern economies-features  that 
Keynes  and Hicks  did not consider-do  not much change the original 
analysis.  I expect  that Krugman's main conclusion  from this exercise, 
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however,  take issue  with some of the simplifying  assumptions  that he 
makes to illustrate his point. 
The basic model presents an endowment  economy  with cash in ad- 
vance constraints. Consumers can hold money or one-period bonds and 
the nominal value of consumption  in each period cannot exceed  money 
holdings.  When  interest rates are positive,  the cash  in  advance  con- 
straint will  bind,  and prices will  be proportional to the money  supply. 
Starting with this simple model,  the first interesting result is that even 
in a full-employment  flexible  price economy,  a version of the liquidity 
trap will  arise when  nominal  interest rates fall  to  zero.  In this  case, 
people become  indifferent between holding money and bonds, the cash 
in advance constraint is no longer binding,  and prices and the interest 
rate no longer reflect current changes  in the supply of money.  Money 
becomes  irrelevant.  This  is a rather strange version  of the trap, how- 
ever,  because  it  is,  by  construction,  a trap with  no  negative  conse- 
quences (in terms of output). The consequences  of a trap get a bit more 
interesting  when  there exists  some  nominal  rigidity-in  this  case,  a 
predetermined price  level  in the first period.  But  in either case,  one 
issue that becomes  apparent with these models is that it is hard to think 
seriously  about  stabilization  policy  in  the  context  of  an endowment 
economy.  Further, if the models  are to apply to Japan, one must surely 
wonder how the enormous stock of past savings might change the model 
dynamics.  In Japan's case,  it is hard to think of consumption  in each 
period being constrained by current money holdings  or income  levels. 
The  next  issue  that Krugman  addresses  is  the  role  of  productive 
investment.  Are the negative  real interest rates that must exist when an 
economy is in a liquidity trap still possible  when productive investment 
is  introduced? The  insight  provided  by  the  model  is  that even  with 
positive  marginal product of  capital,  if Tobin's  q is expected  to fall, 
the rate of return on investment  can be negative.  In a simple  example 
using land and a declining population, Krugman shows that the expected 
return on land might be negative.  But in this setup Tobin's  q is essen- 
tially  exogenously  determined; in a less  stripped-down  model  it may 
not be so easy to produce negative  returns. 
Virtually free capital mobility is one of the features that distinguishes 
modern economies  from the world that Keynes  and Hicks knew.  Can 
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words,  if capital is free to move across national boundaries, under what 
circumstances  (if  any) can the domestic  real interest rate differ  from 
the world rate? In order to analyze this question,  Krugman modifies his 
model  so that the economy  produces two goods,  one tradable and the 
other nontradable. Utility  is assumed to be separable between tradable 
and nontradable goods.  This assumption  also  allows  consumption  de- 
cisions  and real interest rates in the two sectors to be determined inde- 
pendently.  It is then possible  to concoct  a scenario-when  production 
of the nontradable good falls exogenously  over time-in  which the real 
interest rate as measured by nontradable goods  is negative  even  as the 
real interest rate as measured by tradable goods  is positive  (and equal 
to  the  world  interest  rate).  Noting  that the  share of  traded goods  in 
consumption  is relatively  modest,  Krugman argues that the weighted 
real interest rate might therefore be less  than zero. 
It is worth reflecting on the relevance  of an interest rate constructed 
in such a way,  and to do so it is useful  to return to the issue  of inter- 
national capital mobility.  International capital mobility  has two impli- 
cations:  first, that consumption  is constrained by the present value  of 
income  rather than by  national  output; and  second,  that investment 
funds are allocated internationally so as to equate real marginal products 
of  capital  at the  world  interest  rate.  Krugman's  disarmingly  simple 
model considers  only the first of these,  the implications  of capital mo- 
bility  for consumers'  Euler equations,  and disregards  the productive 
aspects of capital mobility (since the model is essentially  an endowment 
economy).  Were productive capital movements permitted, the domestic 
nontradable sector would be a prime candidate for investment,  because 
the prices of its output are expected  to rise.  Indeed,  if it were possible 
merely to store nontradable goods,  it would make sense to do so in this 
model,  given  anticipations  of higher prices  in the future.  One cannot 
store haircuts; but as I look  around my block  in Ann Arbor, I see that 
one can certainly store houses,  and housing,  with one-third of the entire 
capital  stock,  represents  a substantial part of  the nontradable sector. 
More generally,  the scenario  in which  real interest rates are negative 
requires  that prices  are expected  to  rise  faster  than nominal  interest 
rates, that the good cannot be stored, and that it is not possible  to invest 
in this sector so that competitive  forces can drive down future prices.  I 
do not know  to how  much of the economy  such a scenario  applies;  it 
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If the model's  analysis  of interest rates that differ from world rates 
is  not meant to  apply to  investment,  it must therefore  apply to  con- 
sumption.  The  difficulty  with  this  application  is that consumers  face 
the world  interest rate (r)  in selecting  consumption  paths of  tradable 
goods.  Even if the nontradable sector is large, there is always the option 
of  consuming  one  fewer  tradable good  today  in  return for  (1  +  r) 
tradable goods  next  year.  So  consumers  do,  in  fact,  face  the  world 
interest rate in making saving decisions.  Indeed,  in Krugman's model, 
saving  and dissaving  occur' through exchanges  of  tradable goods;  the 
nontradable sector is entirely irrelevant to intertemporal decisionmak- 
ing. Hence an interest rate that is constructed by weighting  interest rates 
on tradable and nontradable goods  by their consumption  shares is not 
relevant to consumption  and saving; the relevant rate is the world in- 
terest rate. The significance  of the nontradable sector in this model  is 
rather that,  since  tradable goods  represent a modest  fraction  of  total 
consumption,  a given  change in interest rates may have a small effect 
on total  consumption.  But this  is  very  different  from saying  that the 
relevant real interest rate is negative. 
The last issue  that Krugman addresses is the role of financial inter- 
mediation.  He makes the case that when nominal interest rates are close 
to  zero,  so  that both  consumers  and banks  are  indifferent  between 
holding  money  and bonds,  the influence of an expansion  of the mone- 
tary base on broader monetary aggregates will depend on both consumer 
and bank behavior. Banks therefore should not be blamed when central 
banks are unable to influence broad money.  In a liquidity trap, neither 
banks  (regardless  of  their condition)  nor consumers  have  the proper 
incentives.  This point is important, and it undercuts many recent anal- 
yses  of the causes of Japan's current economic  situation. 
Having made this point,  and before presenting his novel  policy  pre- 
scription,  Krugman considers the traditional cure for a liquidity trap: a 
fiscal  stimulus.  He is not optimistic  that fiscal policy  can successfully 
stimulate  the Japanese economy,  due to the mysterious  properties of 
Ricardian equivalence.  The view that economies  will completely  offset 
any fiscal actions of the government is not traditionally associated  with 
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology  (MIT)-nor,  for that matter, 
associated with Japan, where the traditional budgetary austerity is com- 
monly  thought  to  leave  ample  scope  for  stimulatory  fiscal  policy  if 
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years,  as  advanced  in  part by  Lawrence  Summers,  a  onetime  MIT 
professor.  The theoretical  limitations  of  models  of  Ricardian equiva- 
lence  are well-enough  known that it is hardly worth cataloguing  them 
here.  Do  they apply to modern Japan? No  one knows  for sure.  But it 
stands to reason that in an economy  in which  consumers  are reluctant 
to spend and the balance sheets of banks and industrial conglomerates 
make it difficult for them to invest in positive net present value projects, 
a fiscal  stimulus  provided  by the government  might have more effect 
than under other circumstances. 
Turning to  the current situation  in Japan, Krugman makes  a con- 
vincing  case  that the economy  is in a liquidity  trap, with  a widening 
output gap,  near zero nominal  interest rates,  deflation,  a low  ratio of 
consumption  to GDP,  and high growth of outside  money  without cor- 
responding  increases  in  broader money  aggregates.  And  he  presents 
some intriguing back of the envelope  calculations  as to just how much 
inflation the Bank of Japan would need to create in order to "untrap" 
the economy.  Krugman's  rather brave bottom-line  policy  pronounce- 
ment is that Japan ought inflate at about 4 percent for fifteen years. On 
the one hand, I admire his willingness  to stick out his neck and actually 
suggest a specific policy  action. On the other hand, I hope that the Bank 
of Japan does  not decide  to follow  his prescription.  Perhaps more im- 
portant, I hope that the market has confidence  that the Bank of Japan 
will  not do so. 
Whatever one's  opinion of the provocative  policy  advice,  this paper 
makes  an important contribution.  Krugman has single-handedly  revi- 
talized  the liquidity  trap and provided the economics  profession  with 
many interesting and urgent research questions.  My expectation  is that 
his bold prescription will provoke economists  and policymakers to think 
creatively  about alternative solutions  to liquidity  traps in general,  and 
Japan's trap in particular. 
Kenneth  Rogoff:  This  is  a truly inspired  paper on  Japan's  ongoing 
"Great Recession,"  although I have to keep pinching myself  to ask if 
its main thesis can really be true. Is the equilibrium (full-employment) 
medium-term real interest rate for Japan actually negative,  so that un- 
less  the Bank of  Japan (BOJ) resigns  itself  to sustained  inflation,  the 
zero bound on nominal interest rates will present serious problems? Has 
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bility  that it has  lost  the  power  to  rekindle  inflation  now  that Japan 
needs  it? 
The idea that the non-negativity  constraint on nominal interest rates 
may  pose  problems  in a world  of  low  inflation has been  receiving  a 
growing amount of attention. Lawrence Summers has warned that there 
may be  times  when  optimal  stabilization  policy  calls  for temporarily 
inducing negative nominal interest rates, but that this may be impossible 
for a central bank that has successfully  drained all inflationary expec- 
tations  out of  the economy.'  Recent  papers that explore  this  issue  in 
more  detail  (without  necessarily  calling  it the liquidity  trap) include 
those  by Jeffrey Fuhrer and Brian Madigan,  Alexander  Wolman,  and 
Athanios  Orphanides and Volker Wieland.2 All  of these  authors, like 
Krugman, use well-specified  maximizing  models to understand the im- 
portance of the zero bound. What distinguishes  the present paper from 
the others (aside from its open economy  perspective  and the extraordi- 
nary clarity of its prose) is Krugman's contention that in Japan, negative 
real  interest  rates  are not  merely  a useful  weapon  in  the  arsenal  of 
monetary policy  but an absolute necessity.  Even if Japan were not in a 
recession,  he  argues,  generational  imbalances  would  still  result  in a 
negative  real interest rate, at least in the short to medium run. If this is 
true, any full-employment  equilibrium must have expected  inflation (at 
least  over  the horizon  that the equilibrium  real rate is  negative),  and 
monetary  policy  is  powerless  to  stop  it.  Thus  the  BOJ's  efforts  to 
maintain price  stability  are not merely  neutral; they  are actually  con- 
tractionary in an economy  badly in need of stimulation. 
Few  academic  economists  would  disagree  with Krugman's  general 
conclusion  that after seven years of deep recession,  the time has come 
for the BOJ to stop trying to stabilize  prices and to allow  at least a bit 
of  inflation.  This  part of  the  story  is  conventional  wisdom,  right or 
wrong.  But Krugman's specific  recommendation  is far more unortho- 
dox: he would have the Bank of Japan try to bring inflation (and infla- 
tionary expectations)  up to 4 percent and keep it there for fifteen years. 
In a world where central banks are still congratulating themselves  for 
conquering the inflation of the  1970s and 1980s,  this is a truly radical 
suggestion.  But if the full-employment  equilibrium (medium-term) real 
1. Summers  (1991). 
2.  Fuhrer  and Madigan (1997); Wolman (forthcoming);  Orphanides  and Wieland 
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interest  rate is  indeed  negative,  then,  as Krugman elegantly  demon- 
strates, inflation is eventually  going  to express itself  in some form,  no 
matter what the BOJ does.  For example,  Krugman's first model  illus- 
trates that an attempt to  target next  period's  price  level  will  tend to 
drive down the current price level (so the economy can have the inflation 
it needs to achieve  a negative  real interest rate). 
This is an interesting and remarkable insight,  but the prescription for 
long-term  doses  of  inflation  is  predicated  on the assumption  that the 
full-employment  real interest rate should be negative.  Is this plausible 
in a country that is still investing  well  over 20 percent of GDP? What 
about the fact that Japanese savers can lend their surplus savings to the 
rest of the world, rather than accept negative real rates at home? I admit 
that  Krugman  makes  a forceful  case  that  "crazy"  just  might  be 
''right."  His  casual  argument is  that the aging  Japanese population, 
desperate to provide  for its own  retirement,  is saving  so much that it 
would take a negative  rate of return to clear the market. He goes  on to 
offer  a simple  overlapping  generations  model  in which  land yields  a 
negative  real return, even  though  its  marginal product is  positive.  I 
should  note  that while  this  result  turns on  the  empirically  plausible 
assumption  (at least for Japan) that future working generations will be 
smaller than the current one,  labor-augmenting  technological  progress 
could  substantially  mitigate or even eliminate  this problem. 
As for why Japan does  not simply  lend its surplus to the rest of the 
world,  where  equilibrium  real rates are presumably  still  positive,  an 
obvious  answer is that international capital markets are far from fully 
integrated. Moreover,  Krugman notes that even if capital markets were 
fully  integrated,  imperfect  integration of  goods  markets can still  lead 
to real, consumption-based, interest differentials. Admittedly his model, 
in which the relative  size  of traded and nontraded goods  production is 
exogenous,  exaggerates  the prospects  for negative  real rates.  If non- 
traded goods  are really going to be so scarce in the future, there should 
be a strong incentive  to shift investment  in that direction.  This would 
raise future nontraded output and therefore raise the consumption-based 
real interest rate.  Still,  all in all,  Krugman builds  an interesting  case 
that equilibrium real interest rates may be much lower in Japan than is 
suggested  by historical  norms. 
Whether or not real interest rates need to be negative for fifteen years 
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time has come for Japan to risk some inflation. No one should seriously 
believe  that the BOJ would  face  any significant  technical  problems  in 
inflating  if  it puts it mind to the matter, liquidity  trap or no.  For ex- 
ample,  one can feel  quite confident that if the BOJ were to issue  a 25 
percent increase  in the current supply and use it to buy back 4 percent 
of government nominal debt, inflationary expectations  would rise. The 
real obstacle is that the BOJ does not want to blemish its record of price 
stability.  As Krugman's formal analysis shows,  in fact, if the BOJ does 
not realize that it needs to let go of its long-term price level  anchor, it 
might  as well  forget  about even  short-term stabilization  policy-but 
that would  seem  a very  second  order issue  in the  midst  of  a record 
recession.  The real problem is that the BOJ does not have the big picture 
right. It does  not realize  that a good  conservative  central bank should 
be  willing  to  let  the  price  level  rise  on  a  rainy  day-and  Japan is 
experiencing  a typhoon. 
Toward the end of  the paper, Krugman intimates  that the new  Eu- 
ropean Central Bank, with its mandate to keep inflation low,  may soon 
face  similar  problems,  since  European  demographics  are  similar  to 
those  of Japan. This  is an interesting  observation,  although the Euro- 
pean Central Bank has a sufficiently flexible mandate that it could easily 
target an inflation rate of  1 or 2 percent for an indefinite period-if  it 
were to perceive  that such a policy  was necessary. 
I have glibly  asserted that the BOJ can always  inflate if it wants to, 
simply  by increasing  the rate of  base  money  growth.  Compared with 
the "normal"  situation of positive  interest rates, however,  an inflation- 
happy BOJ would  be flying  partly blind.  That is,  with the short-term 
nominal interest rate temporarily stuck near zero,  the BOJ would have 
to try to engineer its monetary expansion  without the benefit of a very 
crucial feedback  variable.  This increases  the risk that in trying to en- 
gineer a 4 percent inflation,  the BOJ might find prices going  up by 20 
percent. Given the dire straits that Japan currently finds itself  in, how- 
ever, this small risk seems worth taking, for all the reasons that Krug- 
man argues. 
It is  interesting to contrast Krugman's  prescription  for Japan with 
the conventional wisdom.  The conventional  wisdom  is that, in addition 
to cleaning up its banks, what Japan needs most is real fiscal stimulus 
(as opposed to phony accounting).  Krugman rightly notes that modern 
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yield  a significant  multiplier effect,  even  in the presence of Keynesian 
price rigidities-a  result which does not in fact depend on whether one 
believes  that the country is in a liquidity trap.3 But he neglects  to point 
out  that even  if  fiscal  stimulus  does  not have  a multiplier  effect  on 
output, it could still serve to raise the real interest rate, thereby greatly 
simplifying  the task of the monetary authorities. And while tax cuts do 
not provide any stimulus if Ricardian equivalence  holds-though  in the 
model  Krugman uses  to demonstrate why  real interest rates might be 
negative,  Ricardian equivalence  does not hold-fiscal  stimulus can also 
be applied by increasing government  spending on,  say,  infrastructure. 
Certainly,  if having more government infrastructure investment  means 
that big construction  firms compete  to bribe politicians  and then build 
yet  another bridge  with  a $50  toll,  it does  not sound  appealing.  But 
considering  that 30 percent of the houses  in the greater Tokyo  area do 
not have access  to sewage,  Narita airport is inadequate,  the hospitals 
are awful,  the university  system  weak,  it should be possible  to come 
up with something. 
So a combination  of temporary government  spending  and increases 
in money  supply  would  solve  the liquidity  trap problem-if  there is 
one.  Moreover,  using fiscal policy  in conjunction with monetary policy 
might help to temper any depreciation  of the yen that a monetary ex- 
pansion would  cause. 
Krugman  correctly  argues  that expansionary  monetary  policy  in 
Japan would  most  likely  benefit  the country's  neighbors  and trading 
partners,  even  if  it does  lead  to a significant  depreciation  of  the yen 
exchange  rate. This perspective  is quite consistent  with recent theoret- 
ical  research  on  "new  open  economy  macroeconomics."4  It is  also 
quite  consistent  with  the  interpretation of  the Great Depression  pro- 
posed by Barry Eichengreen  and Jeffrey Sachs.s  They argue that those 
countries that abandoned gold early and inflated did themselves  a lot of 
good  at relatively  little cost to the rest of the world. 
The lessons  of recent research can be carried one step further. Uni- 
3.  Admittedly,  in modern  sticky price intertemporal  models, the impact  of govern- 
ment spending on the real interest rate may be quite different than in flexible price 
models. If a temporary  increase  in government  spending  leads to a concomitant  increase 
in output, there is no tilt in the output available to consumers  and no change in the 
equilibrium  real rate. See Obstfeld  and Rogoff (1995). 
4.  See Obstfeld  and Rogoff (1996). 
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lateral Japanese monetary expansion  would almost certainly be a good 
thing.  But on top of  a big monetary stimulus from Japan, it would  be 
helpful to have a moderate level  of stimulus from the United States and 
Europe, -both to mitigate the depreciation of the yen and to enhance the 
global effects of the expansion.  While I agree completely  with Krugman 
that the BOJ should inflate, however,  I find the prescription of 4 percent 
inflation  for fifteen  years too  exotic.  A  shorter,  sharper boost  would 
seem to make more sense-say,  three years of inflation cumulating to 
20  percent.  But  then,  I  do  not  quite  buy  the  view  that  short-  and 
medium-term full-employment  real interest rates for Japan are negative. 
And even  if they are negative,  the right policy  is probably to raise the 
real interest rate through expansionary fiscal policy,  which would then 
free monetary policy  from its supposed liquidity trap. 
Before  closing,  I should mention a couple  of points about the mod- 
eling,  which  is certainly masterful.  First, the theoretical results on the 
costs  and existence  of liquidity  traps can be quite sensitive  to the way 
in which  money  is  introduced;  shopping  time  models  and money-in- 
the-utility  function models  can have a Pigou-type  effect  and yield  dif- 
ferent results.  Second,  it should be noted that if one  subscribes to the 
Leeper-Sims-Woodford  fiscal theory of the price level-which  I do not, 
but it is darn clever-then  there are reasons other than a liquidity  trap 
why the central bank might lose short-term control over the price level.6 
Although  I  have  taken  issue  with  some  of  the  more  unorthodox 
prescriptions  in this paper,  let  me conclude  by reiterating that it is  a 
stunning piece  of  work.  And it is going  to make a lot  of  economists 
think harder about a problem that we  should have been thinking hard 
about already. 
General  discussion:  Benjamin Friedman applauded the paper, hoping 
that it would  push central bankers and the central banking  literature 
away from the past decade's  mania that inflation is the only problem a 
central bank should worry about. He paraphrased James Tobin's  words 
about the U.S.  economy  in an earlier period: "there  are things worse 
than inflation, and Japan has them."  However,  he suggested that Krug- 
man overstated the difference  between  his notion of the liquidity  trap 
and the original  Keynesian  liquidity  trap; Friedman himself  saw  the 
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original  liquidity  trap as hinging just as much on intertemporal issues 
as Krugman's modern version.  The Keynesian  trap reflected individu- 
als' preference for holding money rather than long-term bonds, because 
of expected  future capital losses  on the bonds.  Policymakers  could not 
push bond prices  any higher,  nor the interest rate any lower,  because 
expected  future bond prices do not move one to one with current prices; 
having  been  pushed  up,  they  are expected  to  fall,  thus  resulting  in 
capital losses.  The focus  on long-term  bonds made Keynes's  original 
discussion  implicitly intertemporal, while Krugman's paper is explicitly 
intertemporal with  one-period  bonds.  Friedman also  took  issue  with 
Krugman's  uncritical  acceptance  of  monetary neutrality.  If monetary 
neutrality  is  to  apply  to  something  other than changes  in the unit of 
account,  it depends on a number of well-known  assumptions,  each of 
which would need to be verified and some of which are likely  not to be 
true in  the  context  of  application  to  a real  world  economy  such  as 
Japan's. 
Martin Baily  noted that a risk-free  interest rate near zero does  not 
mean that the borrowing rate for investment  in private capital is low. 
Just as in the Great Depression,  there is now in Japan a substantial risk 
premium  on  private  borrowing,  and this  may  have  increased  as  the 
environment has worsened.  Consequently,  he noted it is wrong to infer 
from the risk-free rate that there is no constraint on borrowing or that 
the  rate of  return on  capital  investment  is  negative.  Edmund Phelps 
expressed  doubt that the liquidity trap was central to Japan's problems. 
He thought that the excess  supply of nontradable capital goods  and the 
associated  fall  in their price below  the reproduction cost  was  the key 
problem. 
While  accepting  the view  that Japan is in a trap, William  Dickens 
was  skeptical  about the paper's policy  recommendations.  He believed 
that in Japan today,  people  save and hold on to real balances  because 
of uncertainty about the future, fear of job loss,  and the instability  of 
the economic,  and even  the political,  systems.  Given  these  fears,  he 
was  not convinced  that inflation  would  induce  people  to  reduce  real 
balances or spend more, rather than to increase saving for the uncertain 
future. He also wondered how many years of 4 percent inflation it would 
take for the Bank of Japan to convince  people  that it would  not even- 
tually deflate, given its strong perceived commitment to price stability. 
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ment spending  would  rise  if Japan followed  the paper's  prescription. 
He  feared that the only  mechanism  that might work with  Krugman's 
policy  would be the further depreciation of the yen,  which could have 
significant negative effects  on the East Asian region as a whole,  partic- 
ularly if it led China to devalue.  He concluded  that greater fiscal stim- 
ulus  would  be  a preferable  course  of  action,  leading  to  a domestic 
demand-driven  recovery  that would  not have  the effect  of  increasing 
Japanese trade surpluses at the expense  of other East Asian countries. 
Robert Gordon also criticized  the assumption in Krugman's models 
that the monetary authorities can easily change inflationary expectations 
for the future-that  the announcement  of a policy  will  change  expec- 
tations despite  present slack in the economy.  He believed  that agents' 
expectations  depend  largely  on  actual experience,  and that they  will 
experience  increased inflation only when there is pressure in the markets 
for goods,  services,  and labor.  Alan  Blinder  agreed.  He thought that 
Krugman's inflationary policy  would work if it could be implemented; 
but that would  require the Bank of Japan to create expected  inflation, 
which,  in turn, would  require persuading  people  that the future was 
going  to be fundamentally  different  from the past.  Japan had zero in- 
flation in the past six years, and the average in the previous decade was 
1.8  percent per year.  Thus to create expected  inflation of  4  percent, 
with  actual  inflation  lagging  behind,  would  be  difficult.  Baily  con- 
curred,  observing  that it would  be  easy  for Russia  to  be  credible  in 
announcing inflationary policy  but hard for Japan. 
Baily  and Gordon  also  agreed  with  Dickens  that  stimulating  the 
Japanese economy  through increases  in the trade surplus looked  a ter- 
rible idea in the current East Asian situation, just as it was in the 1930s. 
Krugman responded that a yen depreciation would  probably lead only 
to a modest increase in the Japanese current account surplus and would 
not have a major impact on the rest of Asia.  The reason people  fear a 
yen depreciation is that they think this might set off a speculative panic, 
which  would  cause  massive  depreciations  of  other Asian  currencies. 
Krugman suggested  that this kind of reasoning  held hostage  the mac- 
roeconomic  policy  of  the second  largest  world economy  to what one 
thinks speculators might believe,  even though they should not. 
Gordon did not see why Krugman dismissed  fiscal policy on the basis 
of Ricardian equivalence.  He thought that the proper policy was a fiscal 
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not be issuing any debt, Ricardian equivalence  would not apply. Gordon 
believed  that the U.S.  evidence  clearly  showed  that fiscal  expansion 
resulting from preparation for war was critical to ending the Depression. 
Joseph Stiglitz  thought the paper's discussion  of Ricardian equivalence 
was useful in view of the recent disagreement between the United States 
and Japan, when the former advocated  a permanent tax cut while  the 
latter argued that a cut should  only  be temporary.  If the government 
has a strong dislike  for fiscal deficits,  it is difficult to sound credible in 
announcing  a permanent tax cut that will  lead to a continuing  budget 
deficit and more credible to seek temporary cuts.  Stiglitz  also thought 
that the intertemporal substitution  effects  of those  policies  may be as 
important as their income effects.  A temporary consumption tax cut or 
a subsidy could provide strong incentives  to increase current expendi- 
tures. Phelps commented  that fiscal policy,  too,  could affect intertem- 
poral prices,  agreeing  with  Kenneth Rogoff  that one  could  use  it to 
increase  the marginal efficiency  of  capital.  Phelps  thought this could 
be achieved  by subsidies  to either investment  or employment. 
Baily  suggested  that it was useful to think about the policy  problem 
in Japan as how  to shift out an IS curve,  whether by government  ex- 
penditures or by policies  designed  to increase private demand. But he 
wondered about the implications  of the IS curve being so far to the left 
in the first place.  He suggested that poor investment policies  led to very 
high investment in some areas of the economy,  drove up the capital-to- 
output ratio, and drove down the returns to capital.  This has left over- 
investment  and excess  capacity  in industrial parts of the economy.  At 
the  same  time,  there  has  been  substantial  underinvestment  in  other 
areas,  such  as retailing,  which  offer  Japanese investors  high returns. 
He  also  saw  a potential  to expand  residential  housing  despite  demo- 
graphic  trends,  since  most  existing  housing  units  are so  small,  and 
reasoned  that increasing  the  ability  of  consumers  to borrow and use 
credit cards would reduce the saving rate. 
Stiglitz discussed  some of the political economy aspects of increasing 
government  spending  in  Japan.  Most  observers  think  that increases 
would  take the form of  spending on construction,  possibly  further de- 
pressing real estate prices.  In addition,  since the construction industry 
is  widely  perceived  as  having  too  much  influence  under the  current 
regime,  giving  it more support would be unpopular. He also noted that 
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sible  to have large budget deficits,  and noted that this view  was  rein- 
forced by some interpretations of the recent U -S. experience,  according 
to which  a reduced federal  deficit  has led to economic  expansion.  In 
Stiglitz's  own  view,  the  deficit  reduction  helped  the  U.S.  economy 
mainly by reinvigorating the banking system.  In the early 1990s banks 
held a large amount of long-term  government  debt,  and when interest 
rates came  down,  the banks effectively  got  a big  injection  of  capital 
that increased their net worth. 
Stiglitz  believed  that the  credit  crunch  was  more  important than 
indicated by the paper. Indeed, he thought that fear of worsening credit 
constraints  was  one reason why  the government  had not moved  more 
quickly to restructure the banking system.  However,  he was bewildered 
by the belief  of some in Japan that a yen depreciation would reduce the 
ability of banks to make loans.  He argued that weakening the yen would 
increase  the  net  worth of  Japanese  banks that owned  a lot  of  assets 
abroad,  and  would  thus  alleviate  the  problem.  Blinder  agreed  with 
Stiglitz  that the paper was too quick to dismiss  the presence of a credit 
crunch. He observed  that weak economies  weaken banks,  while  weak 
banks weaken  economies,  so that a crunch was not surprising. But he 
acknowledged  that the  existence  of  a crunch  did  not  alter the  main 
argument of the paper. Friedman agreed with Krugman that insolvent 
banks lend  too  much,  not too  little,  in  the  absence  of  regulation  or 
supervision.  He  noted that there are important constraints,  however, 
and that the weight Japanese authorities placed on sticking to the Basle 
capital requirements might explain  why one observed  signs of a credit 
crunch. 204  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1998 
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